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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, Krystal Etsitty, a transgender woman, was fired from her job as a
bus driver for her "intent to use women's public restrooms" along her route.' In
2007, she lost an employment discrimination suit because, the Tenth Circuit held,
her employer's "concern" that "the use of women's public restrooms by a
biological male could result in liability . .. constitute[d] a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for termination.2 According to the Tenth Circuit,
Etsitty was fired not because of her employer's discriminatory beliefs but instead
because of her employer's-and potential female litigants'-"legitimate"
commitment to sex-segregated bathrooms.3 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority
highlights the obvious but often-overlooked reality that sex-segregated
bathrooms are a but-for cause of the current transgender bathroom controversy.
More importantly, the case illustrates a widespread assumption that sex-based
bathroom segregation is not-and should not be-subject to legal change.
Despite a recent rise in litigation surrounding transgender restroom access,
sex segregation of bathrooms has never been the subject of direct legal challenge.
Transgender litigants suing for bathroom access have thus far challenged the
discriminatory enforcement of sex-segregation rather than the sex-segregation
itself.4 Although LGBTQ activists have done significant and important legal
advocacy challenging sex-segregated spaces,' the sex-segregation of bathrooms
1. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1225.
4. In an appeal to the Fourth Circuit, for example, transgender plaintiff Gavin Grimm was careful to
distance himself from any challenges to sex-segregation, urging that "the question is not whether
providing separate restrooms to boys and girls as a general matter serves the governmental interest
in student privacy." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 39, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2056). Indeed, the brief even conceded that sex-
segregated restrooms may be justified. Id. at 41 ("[P]rivacy interests may justify separate but truly
equal and nonstigmatizing restroom facilities for boys and girls . . . .").
5. This includes sports teams, identification laws, and other spheres. For one example of advocacy
directly challenging enforcement of gender binaries, see Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (D.
Colo. 2016), in which intersex activist Dana Zzyym along with Lambda Legal secured a favorable
ruling from a district court after they challenged the State Department practice of requiring a binary
"female" or "male" designation on passports. Transgender and gender nonconforming activists have
also advocated for transgender access to binary spaces in other spheres, even if they have not directly
challenged these binary spaces. For an introduction to the groundbreaking work many LGBTQ
organizations have done to advocate for legal and social reform in the fraught sphere of gendered
sports teams, see Helen J. Carrol, The Present Explosion of LGBT Sports, 34 LAW &INEQ. 499
(2016).
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remains outside of the scope of constitutional concern for many legal advocates
working for gender and sexual justice.6
This fact may be surprising, given that feminists have tirelessly targeted
iistances of overt sex-based classification in our law for much of the last fifty
years. Conservative opponents of transgender bathroom access would likely
attribute this inconsistency to a desire on the part of feminists to preserve the
benefits women receive from segregation. Opponents of liberalized bathroom
laws tend not to frame their resistance as a desire to discriminate against gender-
nonconforming people, but rather as a desire to protect women from men (or
transgender women) who might take advantage of such liberalization.7 Perhaps,
these opponents suggest, feminists have not sought to integrate bathrooms
because they similarly believe that strict segregation protects women's privacy
and safety.8
Such an explanation, however, has the unfortunate effect of pitting the rights
of transgender individuals against the rights of cisgender9 women. 1o While there
6. For a description of the many tactics and considerations that transgender and other activists have
explored for addressing the harms of sex-segregated bathrooms and sex segregation more generally,
see Alex Faktor, Access and Exclusion, 7 J. Hum. SECURITY 10,16-19 (2011); id. at 16-17 ("There
are diverse routes of addressing and approaching this issue. The aforementioned matrices of power
[which perpetuate sex-segregated bathrooms] present-or rather, necessitate-multiple levels of
activism. Some strategies include legal routes, grassroots activism, changing social attitudes, and
various hybrids.").
7. For an example of the safety-based component of this argument, see Kaeley Triller Haver, A Rape
Survivor Speaks Out Against Transgender Bathrooms, FEDERALIST, Nov. 23, 2015, http://
thefederalist.com/2015/11/23/a-rape-survivor-speaks-out-about-transgender-bathrooms [https://
perma.cc/JJJ8-WZTM] (describing how cisgender male predators will take advantage of liberal
bathroom laws to sexually assault women). For an example of the privacy-based component of this
argument, see Fr. Mark Hodges, Proposed Bathroom Bill Will Keep 'Transgender' Men Out of
Girls' Bathrooms in Texas, LIFE SITE, Jan. 9, 2017, https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/public-
reacts-to-texas-proposed-bathroom-privacy-law-with-praise-protests [https://perma.cc/38N6-
SJTV] (describing the "Women's Privacy Act," a bill proposed by the Republican Lieutenant
Governor, which would require people to use the restroom that matches their "biological sex" in
order to protect women's privacy). This essay will discuss these arguments at length infra Part II.C.
8. Conservative media outlets have been eager to highlight that opposition to transgender bathroom
access is an issue over which feminists and conservative groups can unite. See Christians &
Feminists Team Up To Fight Transgender Bathroom Mandate, FOX NEWS INSIDER, Feb. 7, 2017,
http://insider.foxnews.com/2017/02/07/tucker-carlson-tonight-christians-feminists-team-fight-
transgender-bathroom-mandate [https://perma.cc/7GFD-W6V9].
9. The term "cisgender" refers to individuals whose gender identity corresponds with the sex they had
or were identified as having at birth.
10. This dichotomy between transgender people and women is misleading, first and foremost because it
imagines that transgender women do not exist. Because the history of sex-segregated restrooms is
rooted in the ideology of sexual difference, and because this Note intends to engage meaningfully
with the arguments of skeptical readers, it will often refer to "men" and "women" as though they are
binary and biologically distinct. However, it is equally important to remember that these categories
are neither dichotomous nor exhaustive of possible gender identities. For a more complete
introduction to gender terminology than can be attempted here, see SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER
HISTORY 7-24 (2008).
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have been both past" and presentl2 tensions between self-proclaimed women's
activists and transgender activists, there is no reason to assume bathrooms need
be a site of such conflict." LGBTQ advocates have traditionally advocated
strongly against sexual assault and gender injustice, and feminist advocacy
groups across the country have largely voiced support for transgender bathroom
access.1 4 This Note will argue, in fact, that a basic premise of women-protective
opposition to liberalized bathroom access, namely that sex-segregated bathrooms
benefit women in general, is fundamentally flawed. It is time that all those
interested in the rights of women recognize the harms-of constitutional
proportions-that sex-segregated facilities enact.
This Note helps untangle the perceived tension between transgender
bathroom access and women's rights by examining the historical, legal, and
11. See JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, How SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 258 (2002) (describing many feminists' "overt rejection of transsexuals" in the 1970s);
STRYKER, supra note 10, at 94 (relating how in the 1970s "the transgender political movement lost
its alliances with gay and feminist communities in ways that did not begin to be repaired until the
early 1990s, and that, in many ways, have yet to be fully overcome").
12. Although a full examination of the skepticism-and often outright hostility-some contemporary
radical feminists have expressed toward transgender identity is beyond the scope of this Note,
readers interested in this debate will find a careful exploration of the issue in PATRICIA ELLIOT,
DEBATES IN TRANSGENDER, QUEER, AND FEMINIST THEORY: CONTESTED SITES (2010). Elliot
describes rifts and sources of tension among various feminist, queer, and transgender theorists while
ultimately maintaining that "despite sustained efforts . . . to pit feminists against transsexuals ...
alliances [between cisgender women] with transsexuals are possible, even necessary, if we are to
live up to our own political commitments." Id. at 11-12. For a brief introduction to this debate, see
also Michelle Goldberg, What Is a Woman?, NEW YORKER, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2 [https://perma.cc/MM42-LW3R] (describing contemporary
tensions between "radical feminists" and transgender activists).
13. While the Right's women-protective arguments may be sincere, they should also be taken with a
degree of skepticism. Conservative movements have appealed to women-protective arguments in
the past, for example, as a politically strategic means of making their anti-abortion policies more
palatable to the public, even when there was no evidence that these policies advanced the health and
safety of women. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread
of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (describing the Right's
shift to women-protective arguments as Americans became less receptive to their fetal-protective
arguments). Even the Supreme Court has looked with increasing skepticism at these woman-
protective arguments in the abortion context, suggesting skepticism may be warranted in the
bathroom context as well. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
(striking down a Texas law regulating abortion clinics because there was no evidence that it actually
protected women's health and some evidence that it instead undermined women's health).
14. The massive backlash from women's organizations against President Trump's rollback of the Obama
Administration's trans-inclusive Title IX guidance, which allowed transgender students to use
bathrooms conforming with their gender identity, illustrates this point. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l
Org. for Women, Shame on Donald Trump for Rolling Back Rights for Transgender Students, Feb.
23, 2017, http://now.org/media-center/press-release/shame-on-donald-trump-for-rolling-back-
rights-for-transgender-students [https://perma.cc/DX26-LARJ]; Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, Press Release, ACLU Statement on Revoking of Title IX Guidance for Transgender Students
& Impact on Gavin Grimm Supreme Court Case, Feb. 22, 2017, https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-
statement-revoking-title-ix-guidance-transgender-students-impact-gavin-grimm-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/H9A4-ZK9B]; Press Release, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., NWLC Reacts to




normative case against sex-segregated bathrooms."s While scholars have
addressed pieces of this question,' 6 this Note is novel in its integrated
examination of these three essential tools for evaluating the continued
appropriateness of sex-segregated bathrooms. This Note intends to engage
generously and sincerely with the most compelling arguments that sex-
segregated bathrooms are justifiable, and even important, spaces.'7
Part I will address two important aspects of the history of sex-segregated
bathrooms: first, their origins, and second, the historical lack of high-profile
feminist opposition to them. Evidence suggests that sex-segregation originates
from outdated and harmful stereotypes about the nature and role of women. As
such, the original rationales for sex-segregated bathrooms are unlikely to serve
as persuasive legal or normative justifications for continued segregation today.
Part I next examines feminists' historical lack of opposition to sex-segregated
restrooms, with a focus on debates surrounding the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA).' 8 Relying on the work of historians of the ERA, 19 this Note demonstrates
that feminist "support" was instead a careful political strategy that tells us little
about how feminists actually felt about bathrooms or how they should think
about them today.
After this historical examination, Part II demonstrates that legal sources
similarly fail to provide adequate justification for sex-segregated bathrooms. It
will survey judicial opinions touching the matter, highlighting a rich and
underutilized body of legal reasoning. While sex-based segregation has not been
directly challenged in court, transgender bathroom litigation as well as Title VII
cases related to sex-segregated bathrooms have required judges to address what
15. Ruth Colker's recent article Public Restrooms: Flipping the Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 145
(2017), employs a similar framework for evaluating the constitutional appropriateness of sex-
segregated restrooms. While there are similarities between our pieces, this Note aims to engage more
fully with potential objections by defenders of sex-segregated bathrooms. In terms of legal analysis,
this Note draws on a larger body of case law than Professor Colker's; hers focuses primarily on
Supreme Court sex discrimination cases and transgender access litigation. This Note examines a
fairly large body of Title VII case law that Professor Colker does not address.
16. See, e.g., Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture, and Gender, 14
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2007) (exploring the history of sex-segregated restrooms, with less
attention to legal and normative arguments behind the institutions); Christine Overall, Public Toilets:
Sex Segregation Revisited, 12 ETHICS & ENV'T 71 (2007) (exploring the normative arguments
around sex-segregated bathrooms, with less attention to historical and legal arguments).
17. Christine Overall's Public Toilets: Sex Segregation Revisited, supra note 16, takes the other side
seriously. This Note builds on her theory by grounding it in and integrating it with real-world
historical and legal evidence.
18. While other authors have touched on the ERA debates as a means of understanding the history of
sex segregation, their analyses miss this vital contour of ERA supporters' lack of opposition to sex-
segregated bathrooms. Those authors unnecessarily imply that feminists may have supported sex-
segregated bathrooms during this time. See Colker, supra note 15, at 159; Kogan, supra note 16, at
17.
19. This Note primarily relies on JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986), but it also
draws from DAVID E. KYvIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
1776-2015, 394-425 (2016) and DONALD G. MATHEWS & SHERRON DE HART, SEX, GENDER AND
THE POLITICS OF THE ERA: A STATE AND THE NATION (1992).
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interests, if any, sex-segregated bathrooms serve. Judges assert three primary
interests to support sex-segregated facilities: accommodation of biological
needs, protection of privacy, and protection of women's safety. Part II will
explore these asserted interests in detail, and in the best possible light, before
subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny.
Part III will demonstrate that none of the interests marshalled in support of
sex-segregated bathrooms stands up to intermediate scrutiny, primarily because
the sex-specific nature of these interests undercuts their importance. It concludes
that even if these interests were important, sex-segregated bathrooms would do
little to serve them.
Finally, Part IV develops the normative case against sex-segregated
bathrooms. While principles of constitutional sex-discrimination analysis
demonstrate that sex-segregated bathrooms stand on shaky legal ground, some
self-proclaimed feminists may object that a legal challenge-and perhaps even
heightened scrutiny-is inappropriate because sex-segregated bathrooms benefit
women, particularly cisgender women. Drawing on the work of social scientists,
feminist theorists, and other scholars,20 this Part will argue that sex-segregated
bathrooms are in fact normatively undesirable, harming women far more than
they benefit them. Sex-segregated bathrooms perpetuate harmful stereotypes
about women and subordinate women's needs. As such, all interested in
advancing the rights of women should treat them as a proper and desirable target
of constitutional challenge.
I. THE UNREVEALING HISTORY OF SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS
In his dissent to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in G.G. v. Gloucester County,
Judge Paul Niemeyer characterized the decision, which allowed a transgender
student to access bathrooms conforming with his gender identity, as historically
aberrant. "Across societies and throughout history," he urged, "it has been
commonplace and universally accepted to separate public restrooms ... on the
basis of biological sex." 21 There is a good deal of truth to this claim. The claim
also significantly oversimplifies the matter. While a long and relatively
unchallenged tradition of sex-segregated bathrooms in the United States exists,
invoking it as evidence to support continued segregation fails to account for
20. This Note relies most heavily on a collection of essays contained in LADIES AND GENTS: PUBLIC
TOILETS AND GENDER (Olga Gershenson & Barbara Penner eds., 2009). It also relies on Kathryn H.
Anthony & Meghan Dufresne, Potty Parity in Perspective: Gender and Family Issues in Planning
and Designing Public Restrooms, 21 J. PLAN. LIT. 267 (2007); Spencer E. Cahill et al., Meanwhile
Backstage: "Public Bathrooms and the Interaction Order," 14 URBAN LIFE 33 (1985); and Patricia
Cooper & Ruth Oldenziel, Cherished Classifications: Bathrooms and the Construction of
Gender/Race on the Pennsylvania Railroad During World War II, 25 FEMINIST STUD. 7 (1999).
21. G.G., 822 F.3d at 734 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted in part,
137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
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important contours of the history. This Part will explore two of these contours,
demonstrating how the legal and social history of sex-segregated bathrooms
speaks less clearly in support of segregation than it initially appears.
While it is true that sex-segregated bathrooms have never been seriously
challenged in the United States, this does not mean that sex-segregated
bathrooms are an innocuous or neutral feature of American architecture. First, an
examination of sex-segregated bathrooms' origins reveals that they emerged
from nineteenth-century stereotypes about the capacities and role of women.
Second, a study of the ERA debates-a time during which bathrooms were an
unusually prevalent topic of conversation-helps reveal why, despite these
dubious origins, feminists have not historically opposed sex-segregated
bathrooms. Feminists, it seems, have simply not considered this form of
segregation to be subordinating or a worthwhile locus of activism, at least outside
of a few clearly discriminatory settings. Without significant resistance from
feminists or others-until the advent of recent transgender and gender-
nonconforming activism-sex-segregated bathrooms have remained largely
uncontroversial.
A. Origins
Judge Niemeyer suggests that sex-segregated bathrooms have been
universally accepted "[a]cross societies and throughout history," but this is an
overstatement. Sex-segregated restrooms have not been a feature of all social and
legal landscapes since time immemorial. Rather, they are a modern, particularly
Western European phenomenon. 22 Public restrooms did not exist until the
nineteenth century, when they emerged as part of larger sanitary and urban
reform efforts. Although public restrooms appeared in some places by the 1820s,
their first popular debut occurred at the Paris Great Exhibition of 1851.23 Even
then, restrooms were not ubiquitous in many cities until decades later. In the
United States, public restrooms were not a common feature of cityscapes until
well after the 1870s, when public "comfort stations" briefly became a focus of
public health reform. 24 Indeed, by 1896 fewer than one-third of Americans lived
in towns with sewage systems, let alone publicly provided toilets. 2 5
22. Olga Gershenson & Barbara Penner, Introduction: The Private Life of Public Conveniences, in
LADIES AND GENTS: PUBLIC TOILETS AND GENDER 4-5 (Olga Gershenson & Barbara Penner, eds.,
2009).
23. Id. at 5.
24. See Peter C. Baldwin, Public Privacy: Restrooms in American Cities, 1869-1932, 48 J. SOC. HIST.
264, 265 (2014); Terry S. Kogan, supra note 16, at 37. -
25. SAMUEL W. ABBOTT, THE PAST AND PRESENT CONDITION OF PUBLIC HYGIENE AND STATE
MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES, in MONOGRAPHS ON AMERICAN SOCIAL ECONOMICS 40 (Herbert
B. Adams & Richard Waterman, Jr., eds., 1900), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp
.39015037507848 [https://perma.cc/2NSF-7HCR]; see also Kogan, supra note 16, at 37 n.158.
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Even as public restrooms became more common, however, lawmakers
designated them as almost exclusively for men.26 In cases where restrooms were
provided for women, they were generally so inadequate as to be unusable. 27 The
broad failure to provide women with public restrooms reflected and perpetuated
a prominent set of sex-based stereotypes, namely those embodied in the
nineteenth-century ideology of separate spheres. 28 This ideology cast men as
breadwinners and proper occupants of public life, while it cast women as
distinctly domestic, naturally suited to rearing children and maintaining the
home. 2 9 Justice Bradley's 1873 concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, which upheld
a state's denial of a law license to a woman on the basis of her sex, memorializes
this ideology in American jurisprudence:
[C]ivil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. . . . The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. 30
Under this ideology, the provision of public restrooms for women seemed
not only unnecessary, but also threatening. As Barbara Penner and Olga
Gershenson have suggested, "[s]anctioning the woman's lavatory effectively
sanctioned the female presence in the streets, thus violating middle-class
decorum and ideals of women as static and domestic." 31 By providing sufficient
public restrooms for men and not women, policymakers significantly limited
26. Baldwin, supra note 24, at 266 (describing how "many nineteenth-century facilities did not
accommodate women" and how sanitary reform efforts "focus[ed] on men"); Gershenson & Penner,
supra note 22, at 5 ("[T]he vast majority of public facilities were for men only. . . ."). Affluent
women contributed to this disparity by "vot[ing] every[ ]day with their seats, preferring the
consumer model of privacy in department store restrooms to the disturbingly messy egalitarian
municipal facilities." See Baldwin, supra note 24, at 266.
27. See Baldwin, supra note 24, at 268-69 (describing an early women's restroom in the vicinity of
Astor Place, which served 1,000 men and only 25 women per day, in part because the stalls were
too large for affluent women's skirts and the anteroom was "too small to effectively screen the
interior").
28. Gershenson & Penner, supra note 22, at 4-5 ("[S]ex-segregated lavatories were .. .bound up with
... the gendered ideology of the separate spheres.").
29. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 24, at 265-66 ("Americans persisted in speaking as if women's natural
place were the secluded domestic interior, and their mental world encompassed private matters of
emotion and caregiving. Men were said to control the public spaces of the city, and the public life
of business, work and politics."); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology
and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499-1501 (1983) (describing the separate spheres
ideology and its interaction with legal reform and economic thought); see generally Barbara Welter,
The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966) (describing at length Victorian
conceptions of the proper roles and attributes of women, including their relegation to the domestic
sphere).
30. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
31. Gershenson & Penner, supra note 22, at 5.
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women's mobility in cities, creating a biological barrier to straying too far from
home.3 2 The power of absent or inadequate women's restrooms to enforce gender
roles appears starkly in the more modern example of the United States Senate,
which lacked a women's restroom until the early 1990s. Before then, there was
only one restroom outside the Senate chamber, which was labeled "Senators
Only" and reserved exclusively for men.33 This no doubt conveyed a message
about what sex a Senator was expected to be.
Although a shortage of accessible restrooms clearly harmed women, and
women activists worked to secure their broader provision,3 4 the emergence of
women's-only restrooms should not be hailed as an unmitigated feminist victory.
It is significant that policymakers chose to increase women's access by building
more separate restrooms for women rather than by simply integrating existing
men's rooms. While sex-segregated restrooms may seem like an obvious choice
today, converting men's rooms into unisex restrooms could have been an equally,
if not more, efficient solution. Although there is limited scholarship on the legal
origins of sex-segregated bathrooms, 35 evidence suggests that the choice to
systematically sex-segregate restrooms was a product of deeply held stereotypes
about the capacities and roles of women.3 6
In his history of sex-segregated restrooms, for example, law professor Terry
Kogan draws a link between sex-based stereotypes and the emergence of sex-
segregated bathrooms in the American workplace. Despite the separate-spheres
ideology that relegated women to the home, women at the end of the nineteenth
century increasingly emerged into the public sphere as workers and activists.37
Faced with these newly public women, social theorists, scientists, and
policymakers did not choose to reassess their stereotypes about women's
domesticity. Rather, they "reconcile[d] the inherent conflict" by "discover[ing]
the weakness of women."" Some scientists-under a guise of clinical
32. While private establishments such as department stores and hotels sometimes provided restrooms
for women where municipalities would not, these restrooms similarly reinforced the notion that
women belonged in the domestic sphere. Whereas men's rooms were largely functional in these
establishments, women's rooms were elaborate "faux-domestic spaces" intended to make women
feel at home, even in public. Baldwin, supra note 24, at 272.
33. Kathryn H. Anthony & Meghan Dufresne, Potty Parity in Perspective: Gender and Family Issues
in Planning and Designing Public Restrooms, 21 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 267, 271 (2007).
34. Baldwin, supra note 24, at 274-76.
35. Judith Plaskow, Foreword, in LADIES AND GENTS: PUBLIC TOILETS AND GENDER viii (Olga
Gershenson & Barbara Penner eds., 2009) (describing the relative dearth of academic and public
discussion of public restrooms).
36. "Despite common intuitions, the historical and social justifications for the ubiquitous practice of
separating public restrooms by sex were based not on a gender-neutral policy related to simple
anatomical differences between men and women. Rather its origins were deeply bound up with early
nineteenth century moral ideology concerning the appropriate role and place for women in society."
Kogan, supra note 16, at 55.
37. Id. at 21-23.
38. Id. at 24-25.
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neutrality-began to study and postulate inherent differences between men and
women. Such "scientific" findings reinforced and replicated beliefs that women
belonged in the home by casting them as particularly vulnerable when in the
public sphere. 39
These findings convinced legislators that women needed extra protection,
particularly in public spaces such as the workplace.40 Legislators thus began to
pass protective legislation, often limiting the conditions under which women
could work. In Muller v. Oregon, for example, the court upheld a law limiting
the length of women's workdays based on "abundant testimony of the medical
fraternity" indicating that "woman's physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions place her at a disadvantage" in the workplace. 4 1 The Court,
citing recent science, cast women as inherently weaker than men, emphasized
their role as mothers, and "reinforce[d] sexual stereotypes" that served to
"undermine the quality of women's lives."42
Sex-segregated bathrooms find their legal origins in a similar kind of
stereotype-enforcing protective legislation. 43 The first American laws mandating
sex-segregated bathrooms were added as amendments to legislation creating
special protections for women and children workers.44 These laws, with names
such as "An Act to Protect the Lives and Health and Morals of Women and Minor
Workers," were not gender-neutral but aimed to protect women specifically. 4 5
Legislators hoped separate restrooms would accommodate women's "increased
susceptibility to dizziness, fainting, and hysteria" and prbtect their modesty.46
Such clearly stereotypical reasoning suggests that sex-segregated bathrooms
originated from outdated conceptions about the role and capacities of women.
Although many modem sex-segregating bathroom laws are not related to
employment,4 7 the reliance of legislators on sex-based stereotypes in the labor
39. For a discussion of a similar campaign by scientists to construct gendered difference and reinforce
"separate spheres" in the abortion context, see Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions ofEqual Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 280-
319, 322-23 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body].
40. Kogan, supra note 16, at 27.
41. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). The Court was particularly concerned with the impact that unlimited
workdays might have on women's ability to perform their proper domestic role of raising and
teaching the next generation: "[A]s healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength
and vigor of the race." Id. The gendered nature of the Court's protectionist sentiments is particularly
highlighted by its rejection of a maximum-hours law for male bakers only three years earlier in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. Olsen, supra note 29, at 1555.
43. Kogan, supra note 16, at 15-16.
44. Id.
45. Brief of Professor Terry S. Kogan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Gloucester
Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (No. 16-273).
46. Id. at 12-13.
47. For an extensive list of state laws mandating sex-segregation of non-employment spaces, see David
S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 51, 82 n.120
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context suggests they relied on them in others. 4 8 A number of state laws, for
example, require the provision of sex-segregated bathrooms only if women are
"present" or "employed," relying on a stereotypical notion that public and work
spaces are male by default. 49 Further, it is telling that sex-segregated restrooms
emerged simultaneously with sex-segregated spaces that have been long since
integrated, such as libraries, railroad cars, and salons."o These other instances of
sex segregation have disappeared largely due to the advocacy of women who
recognized that their segregation and "[e]xclusion from public accommodations"
had "helped to write male supremacy and heteronormativity onto the social,
physical, and economic landscape of U.S. cities."
The Supreme Court has also increasingly recognized that laws that overtly
classify on the basis of sex-as segregated restrooms do-are constitutionally
unacceptable, in part because they similarly rely on stereotypes about women. In
an about-face from Muller, for example, the Supreme Court has recognized that
laws that explicitly treat women differently because of "posited sociological or
empirical" differences between the sexes are suspect because they often rely on
"'old notions' of role typing" and "increasingly outdated misconceptions
concerning the role of females in the home rather than in the 'marketplace and
world of ideas."'52 Indeed, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court characterized
its own use of separate-spheres language in Bradwell as "an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' responsible for "statute books .. . laden with gross, stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes." 53 The Supreme Court today attempts to root out
such "archaic and stereotypic notions" in the law through a heightened standard
(2011). Some examples include ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.60.705 ("indicating the number of water
closets required for females" in various public spaces as part of the state plumbing code); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN., Ch. 111, § 33 (requiring "separate water closets for the use of each sex" as part
of the state public health code); and WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-15-107 (requiring public assemblies to
provide "[s]eparate enclosed toilets for males and females" in order to be licensed). Much of modern
bathroom sex-segregation not codified, however, and occurs on a purely permissive or voluntary
basis. Cohen, supra, at 81-83, 87, 95-101.
48. Similar sex stereotypes also arise outside of the bathroom context. Professor Reva Siegel, for
example, has pointed out a parallel between legislators' reliance on sex-based stereotypes in both
the abortion and protective labor legislation contexts: "From the criminalization of abortion to the
protective legislation upheld in Muller v. Oregon, physiological argument has played an important
role in justifying regulation that enforces relations of gender status." Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body, supra note 39, at 266.
49. Cohen, supra note 47, at 82-83. See, e.g., 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 109 ("In every establishment where
females are employed, toilets, wash-rooms and retiring rooms shall be provided, . . ."); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-301 ("All persons employing female employees ... shall provide separate privies or
water closets for the female employees.").
50. Kogan, supra note 16, at 7.
51. See Georgiana Hickey, Barred from the Barroom: Second Wave Feminists and Public
Accommodations in U.S. Cities, 34 FEMINIST STUD. 382, 382 (2008) (describing successful feminist
activism leading to the integration of men's clubs, barrooms, and other public accommodations).
52. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99, 208 (1976).
53. 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a law that provided lesser benefits for
spouses of female air force officers).
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of review for sex-based classifications.54 Under such intermediate scrutiny, the
Court has invalidated numerous laws, including protective labor legislation,s
which relied upon some of the same stereotypes underpinning many early
bathroom laws.
B. Sex-Segregated Bathrooms and the ERA Debates
If the early history of bathrooms suggests they may rely on the kind of sex-
based stereotypes unacceptable under intermediate scrutiny, however, the
Supreme Court appears to have avoided the question. In one of its most famous
sex-discrimination cases, United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
confronted the question of whether the all-male Virginia Military Institute (VMI)
could bar women from admission without violating the Constitution.56 Although
the case clarified and buttressed a rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard, it did
not address bathrooms. Justice Ginsburg, even as she ordered integration of the
institution, reassured in a footnote that "[a]dmitting women to VMI would
undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy
from the other sex in living arrangements," implying that the Court was not
concerned with sex-segregated facilities such as bathrooms. 7
Such treatment, particularly by Justice Ginsburg, might appear surprising
given sex-segregated bathrooms' suspect origins. A 1975 opinion piece by then-
litigator Ruth Bader Ginsburg, however, helps account for this quick treatment.
Ginsburg wrote the opinion piece in support of the passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA), defending it against common objections or "horribles."ss
Confronting charges that the ERA might integrate bathrooms, Ginsburg argued
that "regard for individual privacy" would prevent integration. 59 Ginsburg
succinctly captured a common attitude towards bathrooms in a tongue-in-cheek
parenthetical: "(Who would bring the testing lawsuit-women who seek access
to men's WCs, or men who seek access to women's?)." 6 0 The reassurance seems
to be that, even if the ERA might have facilitated suits to integrate bathrooms,
54. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
55. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 210, n.23 (overturning Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) and
thus holding that laws that forbid most women from working in bars due to "moral and social
problems," id. at 466, are unconstitutional).
56. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) [hereinafter VMI].
57. Id. at 550 n.19.
58. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Fear of the Equal Rights Amendment: Taking Exception, WASH. POST,
Apr. 7, 1975, at A21.
59. "Separate places to disrobe, sleep, perform personal bodily functions are permitted, in some




no one cared enough about sex segregation to sue.6 1 Evidently, Ginsburg, a
pioneering feminist litigator, did not envision sex-segregated bathrooms as an
important feminist issue, an attitude likely reflected in her VMI opinion almost
twenty years later.
Ginsburg was not alone. The history of the ERA debates suggests that other
feminists were equally indifferent toward sex-segregated bathrooms; many even
voiced support for them. While debates surrounding the proposed ERA may
seem an unorthodox place to explore historical feminist attitudes towards sex-
segregated bathrooms, the ERA debates capture a rare time when sex-segregated
bathrooms were the subject of substantial conversation. Further, as Professor
Reva Siegel has argued, the ERA debates played a vital role in "forging modern
understandings of discrimination 'on account of sex."' 62 Even though the ERA
was not ratified, "the amendment's proposal and defeat played a crucial role in
enabling and shaping the modem law of sex discrimination." 63 Understanding
why feminists appeared unconcerned with sex-segregated bathrooms during the
ERA debates, then, helps shed light on why our current sex-discrimination
jurisprudence also appears unconcerned with them.
Advocates of the ERA hoped to advance women's equality by amending the
Constitution to say that "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." 64 The
Amendment, first proposed in the 1920s, became a realistic possibility in the
1970s, when it was passed by both houses of Congress in 1972 and ratified by
thirty states by 1973. Although the ERA gained early momentum through the
advocacy of feminist organizations such as the National Organization of Women
(NOW), the Amendment's prospects took a sharp turn for the worse after 1973,
when a conservative coalition of women began to oppose it vehemently. This
STOP-ERA campaign, led by Phyllis Schlafly, cast the ERA as an assault on
traditional values and on women's place in the family and society. STOP-ERA,
which eventually defeated the Amendment, galvanized opposition among
women by arguing the ERA would "strip away safeguards for women and expose
them to peril"65 while providing few or no benefits.
61. Ginsburg appears to have been right: "An extensive search has revealed no case brought under any
state ERA challenging the norm ofpublic single-sex bathrooms." Martha F. Davis, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 419, 446 (2008).
62. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The
Case of the De Facto ERA, 2005-06 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323,
1324 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional Culture].
63. Id.
64. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986). For more on the history of the ERA
ratification process, see DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 1776-2015, 394-425 (2016), and see generally DONALD G. MATHEWS & SHERRON
DE HART, SEX, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF THE ERA: A STATE AND THE NATION (1992) and
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 62.
65. KYVIG, supra note 64, at 410.
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Although opponents focused on the ERA's potential to eliminate dependent
women's entitlements and integrate the military, 66 they also raised the specter of
integrated restrooms. In what its proponents labeled the "potty parable" or "potty
issue," 7 Schlafly and her supporters suggested that the ERA, by eliminating sex
distinctions in the law, would lead to the integration of restrooms.6 8 In fact,
"unisex toilets became one of the four majors themes that activists ... stressed
as central to their opposition." 69 The fervor of anti-ERA activists' opposition to
unisex toilets likely stemmed from their recognition of the link between sex-
segregated toilets and the traditional sex roles they hoped to defend. 0 According
to Donald Mathews and Sharon De Hart, anti-ERA advocates saw
[t]he ladies['] room [as] a haven and sanctuary. The men's was a latrine
and urinal. To charge that the ERA would integrate toilets was to say
that women's washrooms would denigrate into men's rooms. The reality
of women's sexual distinctiveness, relative weakness, and sense of
vulnerability seemed to be starkly highlighted by the unforgiving
brutality of fluorescent feminism.71
ERA opponents seem to have understood how sex-segregated facilities
reflected traditional models of gender, centering around women's weakness and
difference. Proponents, however, did not challenge these assumptions.
According to Jane Mansbridge, "every proponent who addressed the issue in [the
ERA] debates insisted . . . that the ERA would not require sex-integrated
washrooms.'' 72 Even as they took a starkly egalitarian stance on some highly
controversial issues, refusing even to concede that the ERA would not integrate
the military, many feminists seemed untroubled that the Act would not integrate
restrooms.73
Far from seeing sex-segregated toilets as a proper target of the ERA's
egalitarian reach, many feminists instead saw opponents' avid focus on them as
66. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 84-86.
67. MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 64, at 165.
68. Id.; MANSBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 112-13.
69. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 114.
70. See Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in TOILET: PUBLIC
RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211, 225 (Harvey Moltoch & Laura Noren eds., 2010)
("Many people, among them many women, clearly continue to see [laws of urinary segregation] as
a benefit. I am, I must admit, even after careful consideration of the competing arguments, more
inclined to see it as a cost. In this, somewhat perversely, I may see eye to eye with Phyllis Schlafly-
we each suspect that the achievement of equal rights for women may entail an end to sex segregation
in the public toilet.").
71. MATHEWS & DE HART, supra note 64, at 165-66.
72. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 113.
73. Id. at 84-86 (describing, and characterizing as a potential mistake, feminists' refusal to cede




an opportunity to build political capital. They dismissed the claim that the ERA
would integrate toilets as silly, using "[t]his one massive and obvious distortion
of the truth ... to label all of the opponents' arguments as lies, irrelevancies, and
scare tactics not worthy of serious consideration." 74 This strategy to undermine
the opposition was effective. Schlafly quickly backed away from restroom
rhetoric because it "backfired in the legislatures," where "the issue served to
solidify the conviction of middle-of-the-road legislators that the opposition was
irrational." 75
Feminist deployment of sex-segregated bathrooms to undermine the
opposition, however, should not be mistaken for ardent approval of them.
Feminists did not defend sex-segregated bathrooms as a substantive matter. Like
Ginsburg, they merely argued that the ERA would not integrate bathrooms
because of "privacy" concerns.76 But while this privacy interest was often
invoked, as in the VMI footnote, it was little elaborated. Among the few times
that advocates did clarify this privacy interest, their language did not suggest that
feminists hoped to defend sex-segregated bathrooms and all their implications.
Rather, feminists were willing to use bathrooms as a political tool because they
did not see them as subordinating and were thus relatively indifferent towards
them.
This ambivalence is perhaps best illustrated by an often-cited pro-ERA
article by Thomas Emerson, Barbara Brown, Gail Falk, and Ann Friedman,
published in the Yale Law Journal in 1971 .78 The article, which went so far as to
say that the ERA would make sex a "prohibited" classification, nonetheless
urged that "the right of privacy would permit the separation of the sexes in public
rest rooms." 79 Segregated bathrooms would be permitted by constitutional
guarantees of privacy, the authors argued, because privacy is "applicable
primarily in situations which involve disrobing, sleeping, or performing personal
bodily functions in the presence of the other sex."so Further, because "under
74. Id. at 114.
75. Id. ("Even among those members of the public who opposed the ERA, less than 3 percent gave
unisex toilets as either a first, second, or third reason for their opposition."). See also MATHEWS &
DE HART, supra note 64, at 165 (describing how the "potty issue" successfully galvanized antis by
triggering gendered and racialized anxieties but also acknowledging that the argument was "easily"
dismissed as "silly and groundless" by proponents and legislators).
76. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 113.
77. See, e.g., Equal Rights Amendment Notfor Women Alone, NORFOLK J. & GUIDE, Oct. 14, 1972, at
Al (quoting Women's Bureau director and ERA advocate Elizabeth Koontz saying that "the
Constitution guarantees our right to privacy and, therefore, the concern over not having separate
bathrooms for men and women is unfounded").
78. Thomas I. Emerson et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
79. Id.at901.
80. Id. This Note will discuss at length the tenuousness of the claim that sex-segregated bathrooms
advatice any of these privacy interests infra Part II.B.
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current mores, disrobing in front of the other sex is usually associated with sexual
relationships," privacy interests extended to sex-segregated bathrooms. 81
This is far from an impassioned defense of sex-segregated bathrooms.
Shortly after this brief discussion, in fact, the authors asserted that already-
"changing" social "mores" might invalidate the just-cited privacy arguments.8 2
Rather than crafting an exhaustive or conclusive privacy defense, the article
seemed more focused on discrediting the opposition's concerns as "magnified
beyond all proportion" and "dramatic."83 More importantly, the authors seemed
interested in dispatching bathroom objections as quickly as possible,
characterizing them as "diversions from the major issues."84 In contrast to the
authors' controversial argument that the ERA could and should substantially
impact protective legislation and military segregation, as well as family law and
criminal law more broadly,"s they dismissed the issue of sex-segregated
bathrooms as a mere "diversion."
Underlying the authors' different treatment of sex-segregated bathrooms
was their impression that the other sex-based classifications were
"subordinating" while "separate toilet facilities in public buildings, . . . carrie[d]
no implication of inferiority for either sex." 86 This reasoning is strikingly similar
to Ginsburg's in her opinion piece dismissing the bathroom "horrible"-the ERA
would not interfere with sex-segregated spaces such as bathrooms because they
"protect[] privacy without implying inferiority."8 Ultimately, it seems, feminists
defended sex-segregated bathrooms against the ERA both because it was
politically advantageous and because they did not see them as subordinating-
or at least, not subordinating to the class of women that mainstream feminism
represented.
Feminists' historical opposition to sex-segregated bathrooms they have seen
as subordinating reinforces this -assertion. For example, feminists have
consistently and effectively protested historically inadequate provision of
bathrooms for women in public spaces.88 Such "potty parity" activism in the
81. Id.
82. "It should be added that the scope of the right of privacy in this area of equal rights is dependent
upon the current mores of the community. Existing attitudes toward relations between the sexes
could change over time-are indeed now changing-and in that event the impact of the right of
privacy would change too." Id. at 902. By now, the growing number of trans, nonbinary, and gender-
nonconforming people shows that even the phrase "between the sexes" is dependent on current social
mores.
83. Id. at 901, 893.
84. Id. at 893.
85. See id. at 920-78 (discussing the subordinating effects of protective labor legislation, domestic
relations law, criminal law, and military law, which treat women and men differently, and arguing
that the ERA would and should rectify these discrepancies).
86. Id. at 902.
87. Ginsburg, supra note 58 at A21.
88. Kathryn H. Anthony & Meghan Dufresne, Potty Privileging in Perspective: Gender and Family
Issues in Toilet Design, in LADIES AND GENTS: PUBLIC TOILETS AND GENDER 48, 50-53, 56-58
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1980s resulted in expanded requirements for women's toilets in many states. 9
When a lack of women's restrooms operated to exclude women in institutions of
higher education in the 1960s, women staged bathroom invasions and protests. 9 0
Similarly, when bars attempted to use a lack of women's bathrooms as an excuse
to exclude them in the early 1970s, women 'liberated' the bathroom[s]" by
invading and taking them over.9' Feminists' contemporary willingness to
challenge other, clearly subordinating instances of bathroom sex segregation
suggests their acquiescence to broader bathroom segregation during the ERA
debates stemmed at least in part from a failure to understand them as similarly
subordinating.
Feminist proponents of the ERA, then, should not be seen as having heartily
supported sex-segregated facilities. More likely, they viewed sex segregation of
bathrooms as a nonsubordinating and possibly transitory legal distinction and
were therefore comfortable defending it for the sake of political expediency. This
does not mean that feminists and others have uniformly viewed sex-segregated
bathrooms as an important facet of society. To the contrary, it shows that the
apparent universality of sex-segregated bathrooms is in large part the result of
political strategy. A better understanding of bathrooms' potentially
subordinating past-and their present power to subordinate-might dismantle
the popular opinion that segregated bathrooms are beneficial for women.
Understanding the origins of sex-segregated bathrooms, and the ERA-
generated debates about them, demonstrates that a lack of controversy should not
be mischaracterized as support for bathrooms' continued segregation. There is
evidence that bathrooms stem from invidious sex-based stereotypes, and given
the terseness and political expediency of feminists' defense of bathrooms, we
cannot glean much from their lack of opposition. Ultimately, the ERA debates-
an unusually discursive moment in bathrooms' history-tell us very little about
how contemporary feminists, scholars, and judges should think about
bathrooms. 9 2 If sex-segregated bathrooms are to stand up to constitutional
(Olga Gershenson & Barbara Penner eds., 2009) (identifying the unequal or inadequate provision of
women's restrooms as a site of gender discrimination and highlighting activism around these "potty
parity" issues).
89. Case, supra note 70, at 212.
90. Carol P. Christ, Liberation of the Yale Divinity School Library Men's Room, in PULLING OUR OWN
STRINGS: FEMINIST HUMOR AND SATIRE 96 (Gloria Kaufman & Mary Kay Blakely eds., 1980)
(describing a takeover or "liberation" of a male-only bathroom by women students at Yale Divinity
School in the 1960s); Plaskow, supra note 35, at vii (describing the same incident).
91. Hickey, supra note 51, at 393.
92. One legal scholar, writing in 1998, came to a similar conclusion after studying the ERA debates:
"What would feminists today-radical or liberal-say about the prospect of a law that forbade sex-
segregated bathrooms? I really don't know; it doesn't. . . get discussed much." Louise M. Antony,
Back to Androgeny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us About Equality, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
1,3 (1998).
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scrutiny, then, their justification must be found outside of their "uncontroversial"
history.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS
In the absence of clear historical support for sex-segregated bathrooms, it
might seem logical to turn to bathroom jurisprudence as an alternative source of
legal reasoning in support of their continued existence. While their history is
scant, however, case law directly addressing sex-segregated bathrooms is
virtually nonexistent. As Justice Ginsburg predicted, no one has brought legal
claims challenging them. Even transgender and gender-nonconforming
plaintiffs, who routinely face harms arising out of sex-segregated bathrooms,93
have not yet challenged their inherent validity in court. Without such a direct
challenge, judges, litigators, and other interested parties have not had the
opportunity to confront the legal and constitutional implications of sex-
segregated bathrooms. As such, sex-segregated bathrooms, and their interaction
with the Constitution, have remained distinctly undertheorized in case law.
Despite the absence of case law directly on point, however, judges have
indirectly addressed the reasoning behind sex-segregated bathrooms in a number
of cases. These cases generally arise in the Title VII context, where sex-
segregated facilities have sometimes operated to limit individuals' job
opportunities. This occurs, for example, when a woman applies to work as an
attendant in a men's restroom94 or a male janitor is relegated to a less desirable
position so he will not be assigned to clean women's restrooms.95 Although these
cases do not tackle the validity of sex-segregated bathrooms, they frequently
attempt to construct legally cognizable reasons for them. This is because, in order
for a bathroom-based employment policy to pass Title VII scrutiny, an employer
must often show that being the "right" sex to work in the bathroom is a Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ). 96 In other words, an employer must
demonstrate that an employee is categorically unqualified for a job that requires
93. For instance, sex-segregated restrooms are sites of subordination and violence for many transgender
women and other gender nonconforming people, in part because of their reinforcement of gender
stereotypes and sexual difference. In one survey, 70% of transgender and gender nonconforming
people reported "being denied access, verbally harassed, or physically assaulted in public
restrooms." Jody L. Herman, Gendered Restrooms and Minority Stress: The Public Regulation of
Gender and Its Impact on Transgender People's Lives, 19 J. OF PUB. MGMT. & SOC. POL'Y 35, 35
(2013).
94. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
95. Hernandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214, 217 (D. Minn. 1992).
96. Title VII prohibits a covered employer from "limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing]" employees
based on sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). Title VII contains an exception, however, for "bona
fide occupational qualification[s]," commonly called BFOQs. The statute provides that a BFOQ
exists if sex-based hiring, referring, or classifying of workers is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012).
[Vol. 29:465482
Sex-Segregated Bathrooms
them to enter or observe an opposite-sex restroom. As judges evaluate whether
an employee's presence in the "wrong" restroom is reason enough to disqualify
them from employment, they necessarily confront the reasons for having sex-
segregated bathrooms in the first place.
Another more recent source of judicial reasoning about sex-segregated
bathrooms emerges from contemporary transgender bathroom-access litigation.
Those who argue in court that transgender individuals must be excluded from the
"wrong" bathroom necessarily argue that so-called "biological" sex-based
segregation serves important interests. Judges must evaluate these asserted
interests and the degree to which strictly sex-segregated bathrooms serve them.
Transgender bathroom litigation, like Title VII case law, presents an unusual
situation in which judges need to construct some legal reasoning behind sex-
segregated bathrooms.
Although judges' reasoning about bathrooms is diverse, a survey of Title VII
case law and transgender bathroom litigation reveals a common pattern. Judges
repeatedly return to two primary interests to justify sex segregation in bathrooms:
privacy and safety. Judges also bring up a subsidiary interest of accommodating
biological differences. These interests align with common lay defenses of sex-
segregated bathrooms.97 Unfortunately, much like feminists during the ERA
debates, judges often invoke these interests without explaining them in any
depth. Unlike the reasoning of political actors, however, judicial reasoning-
particularly in the realm of sex-based distinctions in law-requires more careful
inspection. This Part will explore the contours of the biological, privacy, and
safety interests that judges assert as justifications for sex-segregated bathrooms.
This Part will seek to refine and concretize these interests before subjecting them
to more rigorous scrutiny in Part III.
A. The Interest in Accommodating Biological Differences
Judges have often, particularly in the context of transgender litigation,
grounded discussions of sex-segregated bathrooms in some notion of
"biological" or "physiological" differences. A typical version of this reasoning
appears in dicta from a sex-based equal protection case, Faulkner v. Jones.98 In
deciding whether a school's all-male admissions policy violated the Constitution,
a judge explained that "'separate-but-equal' facilities" are acceptable only if
"justified by acknowledged differences." 99 The judge then invoked bathrooms as
97. In her essay on sex-segregated bathrooms, Louise Antony noted that when she asks people why
bathrooms are sex-segregated, almost all "give[] one of three answers: they say either a) we do it
because the anatomical differences between men and women are relevant to the purposes of
bathrooms; or b) it's necessary to secure the safety of women in a sexist world; or c) it's necessary
in order to provide people with 'privacy."' Antony, supra note 92, at 4.
98. 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993)
99. Id. at 232 (emphasis omitted).
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an example: "[t]he point is illustrated by society's undisputed approval of
separate public rest rooms for men and women .... The need for privacy justifies
separation and the differences between the genders demand a facility for each
gender that is different."100 The district court deciding G. G. v. Gloucester County
cited this language to support a restriction of transgender students' restroom
access: "[riestrooms . . . are designed differently because of the biological
differences between the sexes. ... Male restrooms, for instance, contain urinals,
while female restrooms do not. Men tend to prefer urinals because of the
convenience.""0 1 These arguments are used to justify not only the exclusion of
transgender people from sex-segregated restrooms, but also the existence of sex-
segregated spaces in the first place. The exclusion of transgender, intersex, and
nonbinary people is baked into the very premise of "sexual difference."
In a further appeal to such interests, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina recently offered a colloquy on the importance
of "physiological differences" in Carcaho v. McCrory.10 2 The case concerned a
challenge to a North Carolina law requiring that multiple-occupancy bathrooms
be designated for and used by persons based on their biological sex.' 0 3 The court
catalogued various examples of physiology as a source of justification for sex
segregation and concluded that "physiological differences between men and
women give rise to the privacy interests that justify segregating bathrooms,
showers, and other similar facilities on the basis of sex." 04 These interests alone
were significant enough to support a holding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to
succeed on the merits of their equal-protection claim.
Notably, the interest the judges invoke in these cases is not an interest in
biological difference itself but rather an interest in accommodating that
difference. Bathrooms tailored to each sex help accommodate biologically driven
"demands," making things more "convenien[t]" for everyone. It is also important
to note that the judges do not assert this interest on its own to justify segregation.
In Faulkner, the judge implied that an interest in accommodating "the differences
between the genders" works in tandem with "privacy" to make "separate but
equal" bathrooms constitutionally permissible.'s The G.G. and Carcaho
opinions took similar approaches. Immediately after discussing biological
differences that require different facilities, the G. G. court continued that "society
demands that male and female restrooms be separate because of privacy
100. Id.
101. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 750 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev'd in
part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
102. 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 643 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
103. The court defined biological sex as the sex listed on individuals' birth certificates. Id. at 621.
104. Id. at 645.
105. Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d at 232.
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concerns." 106 Further, sex segregation is necessary to advance "universally
accepted protections of privacy and safety that are based on the anatomical
differences between the sexes." 0 7 The Carcaiio court held that "physiological
differences," primarily people's "genitals," give rise to special privacy interests.
While differing biological needs may create an interest in providing differing
facilities, it is privacy and safety interests that mean these sex-specific
accommodations must be provided in the form of segregated restrooms, rather
than one common facility fully equipped to serve "both" sexes.
An interest in accommodating biological difference, then, is less an
independent interest judges use to justify sex segregation and more an interest
linked to issues of privacy and safety. Nonetheless, it is important to note at the
outset that some judges overtly attach importance to notions of biological
difference in the bathroom context. Other judges-who do not overtly mention
biological differences-implicitly rely on these same differences. As the rest of
this Part will discuss, assumptions about biological difference underpin most
assertions of privacy or safety interests.
B. The Interest in Protecting Privacy
The interest that judges most commonly assert as a justification for sex-
segregated bathrooms is privacy. The primary Supreme Court decision touching
on the question of sex-segregated bathrooms, as discussed in Part I, uses privacy
as its justification. Again, in a footnote to VMI, Justice Ginsburg held that even
though Virginia must integrate its military institute, "[a]dmitting women to VMI
would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex
privacy from the other sex in living arrangements. ... . Although the footnote
does not overtly mention bathrooms, it is often cited in lawsuits over bathroom
use, and the privacy interest it invokes is a common feature of contemporary
transgender bathroom litigation. 09 The privacy interest, however, far predates
106. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 750.
107. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 730 (4th Cir.) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), vacated and
remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017). In its decision to enjoin the Obama
Administration's Title IX guidance, a Texas district court also subsumed biology under privacy,
reasoning that "separation from members of the opposite sex, those whose bodies possessed a
different anatomical structure, was needed to ensure personal privacy" in the bathroom. Texas v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 833 (N.D. Tex. 2016), order clarified, No. 7:16-CV-00054-O,
2016 WL 7852331 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016).
108. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 n.19 (1996).
109. Privacy rights were a ubiquitous assertion by plaintiffs challenging the Obama Administration's
Title IX guidance, for example. For just a few examples, see Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local
Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2016), appeal docketed,
No. 16-4117 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2016); Students & Parents for Privacy v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No.
1:16-cv-4945 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2016); Privacy Matters v. U.S. Dep't ofEduc., No. 16-cv-3015 (D.
Minn. Oct. 27, 2016).
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the 1993 VMI opinion, featuring in bathroom-related Title VII litigation dating
back to the 1970s.
If the privacy justification is ubiquitous, however, it is also vague. Much like
in the VMI footnote, judicial mentions of privacy as a justification for sex-
segregated facilities are often limited to one or two sentences and are largely
unelaborated.110 Despite judges' apparent reluctance to expand on the privacy
interest at stake in sex-segregated bathrooms, it is nonetheless possible to
identify some aspects of this interest by broadly examining Title VII and
transgender bathroom case law.
A large component of the privacy interest in the sex segregation of
bathrooms appears to relate to nudity and a right to protect one's naked body
from unwanted exposure. This interest first appears in a 1963 case called York v.
Story, which held that there is no "more basic subject of privacy than the naked
body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure[] from view of strangers, and
particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect
and personal dignity."'1 1 Courts often, albeit only indirectly, assert this interest
as a reason people cannot go into the "wrong" bathroom.
In Norwood v. Dale Maintenance Systems, for example, a court held that
being male was a BFOQ for attendants of men's bathrooms because "men would
not be able to urinate if a woman were present in the men's washroom." 112 The
court appears to suggest that, if a woman were present, a man could not use the
bathroom because of an intolerable risk of bodily exposure. The district court
employs the same logic euphemistically in the G.G. case. It found that a
transgender boy's presence in a men's restroom would be unacceptable in part
"because people sometimes turn while closing their pants."ll 3 With a meticulous
sense of propriety that appears to forbid even directly describing the relevant
risk, the court implies that transgender boys cannot share a bathroom with
cisgender boys due to an intolerable risk of genital exposure. More directly, the
Carcaflo court asserted an uncontested privacy "interest in ... ensuring that '12-
110. Faulkner v. Jones's assertion that "society's undisputed approval of separate public rest rooms for
men and women [is] based on privacy concerns" provides a typical example. 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th
Cir. 1993). See also Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 833 (urging that Title IX regulations
allowing for separate bathrooms were based on the recognition that "separation from members of
the opposite sex, those whose bodies possessed a different anatomical structure, was needed to
ensure personal privacy" but offering no further explanation).
111. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). While courts
frequently cite this case in relation to bathrooms, they often fail to explain the fairly egregious facts
out of which this language emerged. York v. Story concerned a group of police officers coercing a
woman to undress and pose for sexualized nude pictures when she came in to report an assault. The
police officers then distributed the photos without her permission. Analogizing coercive
photography and distribution of images of a woman's naked body to the accidental and temporary
exposure possible in a bathroom is misleading. For an example of such a misleading quotation, see
G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 751 (citing York v. Story).
112. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1417 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
113. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 751 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.
2016).
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year-old girls who are not familiar with male anatomy' are not exposed to male
genitalia by 'somebody older"'1 4 to justify excluding all transgender people
from the "wrong" bathrooms. Evidently, sex-segregated bathrooms protect
privacy interests by shielding users from unwanted exposures of their bodies and
from unwanted exposure to the bodies of others.
There is also another, narrower aspect of the asserted privacy interest in
bathroom segregation. As one court put it, sex-segregated public restrooms
"respect[]" "the sanctity of the right of privacy in the performance of excretory
functions."'15 Distinct from an interest in preventing exposure of the body itself,
this privacy interest instead seeks to prevent exposure of what the body does in
the bathroom. This component of privacy seems to cover a whole range of sights
and sounds that may occur when someone is in the bathroom-protecting from
disclosure the smells and sounds that accompany excretion,"' the sight of
menstrual blood"1 ' or sanitary products, 18 or even the fact that one has used the
bathroom at all.119 In addition to the risk of bodily exposure, risk of these more
subtle kinds of exposure may explain why a judge insisted that if a woman janitor
were present in a bathhouse, men would be "unable to use the toilet facilities in
that bathhouse without suffering violation of their privacy rights." 2 0
Understanding the exact nature of this second, more specific privacy right,
114. Carcatio v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 644 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (citations omitted).
115. Local 567 Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees v. Michigan Council 25, Am. Fed'n of
State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (citing A. Larson,
Employment Disc.-Sex § 1430, 4-8 (3d ed. 1980)).
116. Although my research turned up no instances of judges directly discussing this aspect of the
"sanctity" of bathroom privacy, anxieties about sights and smells are undoubtedly part of this
interest. As Ruth Barcan has suggested, "[i]f we were rid of the shames of smell and sound, perhaps
men and women might even consent to share the same physical space" of the bathroom. Ruth Barcan,
Dirty Spaces: Separation, Concealment, and Shame in the Public Toilet, in TOILET: PUBLIC
RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 25, 38 (Harvey Moltoch & Laura Noren eds., 2010).
117. Onejudge, for example, held that female sex is a BFOQ for a women's prison guard because "[s]ome
inmates may wish to use the toilet upon ansmg ... one may find her night clothes and bedding
visibly soiled from an unexpected menstrual flow and wish to clean up." Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp.
1095, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980). The judge continued
that, "[u]nder these circumstances, I deem it inappropriate for a male guard to be making the first
count of the morning with the inmates just awakened and their doors locked open." Id.
118. See, e.g., Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737, 758 (2004) (holding that
female sex was a BFOQ for a women's prison in part because "the officers ... supervise 'the most
intimate aspects of an inmate's life,"' such as when they "use the restroom" or "request sanitary
items" (citations omitted)).
119. This is implied, for example, by an Illinois judge's language in Norwood v. Dale Maintenance
Systems, which held that male sex was a BFOQ for cleaning a men's restroom. Even though plaintiffs
suggested that female janitors could simply leave the restroom if men needed to use it, the court
rejected this because "tenants would be faced with a greater probability of embarrassing or stressful
confrontations with cleaning attendants of the opposite sex in their washroom." 590 F. Supp. 1410,
1423 (N.D. Ill. 1984). There is no reason that this situation would be "embarrassing or stressful"
unless an attendant merely knowing that you are using the restroom violates a privacy interest.
120. Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (holding that male sex was
a BFOQ for being a janitor in a men's locker room and toilet facility).
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however, is still more difficult given judges' even greater reluctance to directly
discuss it in their opinions. 12 1
Despite some fuzziness about the reach of the privacy interest in protecting
the naked body and its functions from disclosure, and innocent eyes from
exposure, one thing is clear: in the context of bathroom segregation, these
privacy interests are imagined to exist primarily against the "opposite sex." York
v. Story stated this concept explicitly when it established a privacy interest in
"shield[ing] one's unclothed figure[] from view of strangers, and particularly
strangers of the opposite sex."1 22
The point is further illustrated by Norwood v. Dale Maintenance Systems, in
which the court suggested that the only acceptable solution to the privacy
concerns posed by opposite-sex bathroom attendants was to forbid women from
working in men's rooms and vice versa. 123 Norwood rejected the alternatives the
plaintiff offered, such as having the attendant knock before entering or having
her leave if a man entered, reasoning that "privacy would be invaded to a degree
under any opposite sex system." 12 4 In reaching the conclusion that no gender-
neutral solution was required, the court relied heavily on expert testimony that
"the current same sex policy imposes no stress on the users of the washrooms,
whereas . . . the invasion of privacy that would be created by an opposite
procedure would be extreme."1 25 In other words, a man using the bathroom in
the presence of a male attendant creates little to "no" privacy issue, whereas a
man using the bathroom in the presence of a female attendant creates an
"extreme" privacy issue.
Judges have repeatedly emphasized that these privacy interests operate
relative to the "opposite sex." 126 The current state of public restrooms confirms
this: if people had a privacy interest in protecting exposure of their bodies and
bodily functions from all people, urinals would present an unacceptable violation
of privacy, and the presence of a bathroom attendant of any sex would constitute
an "extreme" invasion of privacy. Further, if courts were worried about unwanted
121. This unwillingness to delve too deeply into this issue is perhaps best captured by a Michigan judge:
"[S]ince the essence of the matter here under consideration is personal privacy, there are no
imperatives, no 'shoulds' or 'shouldn'ts.' That is the essence of privacy, that there is no norm. It is
private." Local 567 Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees v. Michigan Council 25, Am.
Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1986). As Judith
Plaskow has observed, "[t]he topics of gender, sexuality, and the body have been all the academic
fashion for four decades, but the issue of toilets seems to be surrounded by the same embarrassment
and taboos that generate toilet jokes in the wider culture." Plaskow, supra note 35, at viii.
122. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939
(1964).
123. Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1422.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1417 (emphasis added) (citing Plaintiffs' Reply 89).
126. Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-CV-00054-O, 2016 WL4426495, at *14 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21,2016)
(noting that students "have a privacy right to avoid exhibiting their 'nude or partially nude body,
genitalia, and other private parts' before members of the opposite sex") (emphasis added).
488 [Vol. 29:465
Sex-Segregated Bathrooms
exposure of naked bodies to innocent eyes as a general matter, the Carcaho court
would extend its worry about "1 2-year-old girls" to 12-year-old boys exposed to
"mature" "male genitalia" at these same urinals. 127 Sex-segregated bathrooms, in
fact, do little to serve sex-neutral privacy interests because they do not
necessarily protect people from unwanted bodily exposure to members of their
same sex. They do, however, appear to serve sex-specific privacy interests. Sex
segregation, by keeping men and women in different rooms, certainly makes it
less likely that a man or woman will see or hear someone of the opposite sex
while in the bathroom.
The privacy interest that judges assert sex-segregated bathrooms serve,
however, can be clarified further-by examining the injury judges imagine
integration might produce. A California court phrased it most succinctly in a
1976 case, In re Long, which condemned the use of female observers in the toilet
facilities of a prison for young men. The court not only held that the practice
violated sex-specific privacy interests, but also described the specific injury that
such privacy interests seek to prevent: "injured self-esteem, humiliation and
embarrassment arising out of enforced nudity and conduct of bodily functions
within the perceptive range of members of the opposite sex." 28 The "privacy
interests" at stake in sex-segregated bathrooms, then, are not only in preventing
unwanted exposure of one's body or bodily functions to members of the opposite
sex (or unwanted exposure to such "opposite" bodies), but also in preventing the
embarrassment and shame that would result from such exposure.1 29
In re Long is not the only decision to draw this link between sex-segregated
restrooms and the prevention of embarrassment or shame. The Norwood court
rejected the possibility of female bathroom attendants in part because it might
lead to "embarrassing or stressful confrontations."130 Female attendants
knocking before entering, the court noted, would not alleviate such stress because
"the knock may not be heard due to distance from the door or the noise caused
by running water."' 3 1 Discussing the privacy interests at stake in sex-segregated
prison facilities, another judge held that male presence at night in a women's
facility creates "the risk of at least embarrassment or shame or humiliation." 32
Litigants seeking to prevent transgender access to bathrooms often invoke the
127. Carcafio v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 644 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
128. In re Long, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735 (Ct. App. 1976).
129. For an example of such reasoning in the hospital BFOQ context, see Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666
F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (upholding a hospital's discriminatory layoff policy on the
grounds that the hospital needed to ensure that there were enough male orderlies on staff to
catheterize patients, a task female nurses could not perform under hospital policy in order to avoid
embarrassment to male patients).
130. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
131. Id.
132. Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.
1980).
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embarrassment, humiliation, and shame caused by sharing bathrooms with the
"opposite" sex,133 and this language has been picked up by some courts as
well. 134 As the Carcalio court fastidiously noted, "It is also possible that sex-
segregated facilities protect against embarrassment from engaging in intimate
bodily functions in the immediate vicinity of the opposite sex, regardless of
whether one's body is subject to view." 3 5
The social and cultural poignancy of this shame-related, sex-specific privacy
interest is perhaps best articulated by Judge Posner, in his dissent in Johnson v.
Phelan.1 3 6 In this case, a male prisoner argued that his constitutional privacy
rights were violated when female guards were "assigned to monitor male
prisoners' movements and c[ould] see men naked in their cells, the shower, and
the toilet."l37 Although the majority rejected the plaintiffs privacy argument,
partially because courts have held prisoners to have fewer privacy rights than
nonincarcerated persons, 138 Judge Posner wrote an impassioned dissent
defending the fundamental importance of opposite-sex privacy rights. In his
dissent, Judge Posner urged that requiring prisoners to be monitored by opposite-
sex guards treats them "no better than animals" and akin to dogs "in a kennel."l 39
Because of a "nudity taboo" that "is particularly strong" against "the opposite
sex," cross-sex guarding inevitably produces embarrassment, shame, and anxiety
so extreme that it amounts to "the infliction of [a] cruel and unusual
psychological punishment[]."l40
In Judge Posner's view, then, a privacy interest against the opposite sex rises
to the level of a basic right and an essential component of our humanity. The
interest is so strong, in fact, that it rightfully overcomes the sex-based equality
133. See, e.g., Brief of The Family Foundation of Virginia, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant-Appellee at 17, G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736
(E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 15-2056); Complaint at 1 32, Women's Liberation Front v. U.S. Department
of Justice et al., No. 1:16-cv-00915 (D.N.M. August 11, 2016).
134. G.G., 132 F. Supp. 3d at 752, rev'din part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
135. Carcaiio v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 623 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
136. 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
137. Id. at 145.
138. Id. at 146 ("Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-30, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200-02, 82 L.Ed.2d 393
(1984), observes that privacy is the thing most surely extinguished by a judgment committing
someone to prison. Guards take control of where and how prisoners live; they do not retain any right
of seclusion or secrecy against their captors, who are entitled to watch and regulate every detail of
daily life.").
139. Id. at 151-52 (Posner, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 152, 154.
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values of Title VII. 141 Judge Posner criticizes "radical feminists"142 who ignore
such opposite-sex privacy rights, urging that they make the error of pursuing
"sexual equality .. . with no regard to competing interests, and with an eye blind
to reality." 4 3 While this impassioned dissent is in reaction to state-enforced
opposite-sex observation far more extensive than what occurs in any public
restroom, its appeal to "reality" and the importance of cultural norms differs only
in degree from judges' reasoning in cases involving attendants in public
bathrooms. Whether it is a knock on the bathroom door or direct observation, the
psychological harm-embarrassment, anxiety, or shame-produced by the
threat of exposure of one's body or bodily functions to members of the opposite
sex is a "reality" that deeply concerns judges.
Taken together, courts' somewhat vague invocations of "privacy" take a
more concrete form: an interest in avoiding the embarrassment, stress, or shame
caused by unwanted exposure of one's body or bodily functions to members of
the opposite sex (or unwanted exposure to such "opposite" bodies and functions).
While judges and others clearly understand this interest to be fundamentally
important, identifying the interest in specific terms is essential to understanding
whether it is ultimately "important" enough to withstand intermediate scrutiny.
Further, it helps illuminate whether bathrooms actually serve this interest. More
importantly, as Part III will discuss, understanding the specific nature of this
interest helps reveal how broad, "reality"-based, and apparently innocuous
invocations of privacy in the bathroom context actually import and preserve
invidious sex-based stereotypes about biology, modesty, and sexual difference
in the law.
C. The Interest in Protecting Women's Safety
Conservative advocates frequently invoke fears about women's safety as a
justification for "keeping men out of the women's bathroom" in contemporary
transgender bathroom-access debates.1 4 4 Such language is not new; opponents of
the ERA also invoked the image of "rapists" in the bathroom in an attempt to
141. "1 have no patience with the suggestion that Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 forbids a prison
or jail to impede, however slightly, the career opportunities of female guards by shielding naked
male prisoners from their eyes." Id. at 153.
142. "There are radical feminists who regard 'sex' as a social construction and the very concept of 'the
opposite sex,' implying as it does the dichotomization of the 'sexes' (the 'genders,' as we are being
taught to say), as a sign of patriarchy." Id. at 152.
143. Id. at 155.
144. John Hawkins, When Did It Become Controversial to Keep Men Out of the Women's Bathoom?,
TOWNHALL, Apr. 5, 2016, https://townhall.com/columnists/johnhawkins/2016/04/05/when-did-it-
become-controversial-to-keep-men-out-of-the-womens-bathroom-n2143586 [https://perma.cc
/VQ3Y-2S23]; see also Elizabeth Edens, Commentary: Keep Men Out of Women's Restrooms, CHI.
TRiB., Apr. 7, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-bathrooms-
transgender-north-carolina-women-men-perspec-0408-20160407-story.html [https://perma.cc
/RE47-7DMW].
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undercut the Amendment.1 45 Such concerns have also featured in judicial
reasoning. In addition to relying on biological difference and privacy, judges
have often relied on an interest in protecting women's safety as a reason to keep
spaces such as restrooms strictly sex-segregated. A number of Title VII cases
addressing similarly sex-segregated spaces help illuminate the details of this
safety interest.
Invocations of women's safety as a justification for sex-segregated
bathrooms feature prominently in briefs and complaints in the transgender
litigation context. In a suit challenging the Obama Administration's trans-
inclusive Title IX guidance, for example, a group of self-described "radical
feminists" asserted that allowing transgender women into women's bathrooms
would undermine the "safety offered by restrooms" and would lead to an
"increased risk of sexual assault."1 46 The Gloucester County School Board
invoked similar safety concerns as a reason for excluding students from the
"wrong" restroom,1 47 and North Carolina Governor McCrory asserted the "safety
of women and children" as a primary motivation for the state's Bathroom Bill in
Carcallo.1 4 8 When transgender woman Krystal Etsitty's employer fired her
because she used women's restrooms along her route, the company defended
itself from Title VII liability by suggesting that "[w]omen have legitimate
concerns about privacy and safety underlying their desire not to share restrooms
. . . with men."'4 9
While safety concerns frequently feature in litigants' arguments, however,
judges have dedicated even less time to explicating this safety justification for
sex-segregated bathrooms than they have to the privacy justification. The Ninth
Circuit's denial of a transgender woman's Title VII claim after she was fired for
using the women's restroom is one example. Even though the plaintiff was able
to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, the court held that it was
overcome by the School Board's "evidence that it [had] banned [the plaintiff]
from using the women's restroom for safety reasons." 50 The court offered no
145. See, e.g., MANSBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 113 ("The unisex toilet issue fed the fervor of the anti-
ERA forces by giving them something absolutely outrageous to focus on. It could conjure up visions
of rape by predatory males."); Neil J. Young, How the Bathroom Wars Shaped America, POLITICO,
May 18, 2016, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-bathroom-bills-politics-
north-carolina-lgbt-transgender-history-restrooms-era-civil-rights-213902 [https://perma.cc/SV9V-
VRZJ].
146. Complaint at ¶¶ 30, 32, Women's Liberation Front v. U.S. Department of Justice et al., No. 1:16-
cv-00915 (D.N.M. August 11, 2016).
147. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 n.1 1(4th Cir. 2016) (discussing,
and dismissing, "the Board's invocation of amorphous safety concerns" as a reason for traditional
sex segregation in bathrooms).
148. Carcafio v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 645 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
149. Brief of Appellees Utah Transit Authority & Betty Shirley at 32, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502
F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-4193), 2005 WL 3749267.
150. Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App'x 492, 494 (9th Cir. 2009).
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further elaboration. The district court in G.G. was similarly taciturn. While it
hinted that sex-segregated bathrooms were necessary to the School Board's task
of "providing safe and appropriate facilities for . .. students," it did not explain
this assertion.Y' Likewise, the Carcailo court merely noted that the state-asserted
safety interest for the Bathroom Bill was legitimate without further
elaboration.' 5 2
Nonetheless, Judge Niemeyer's dissent to the Fourth Circuit's decision in
G. G. once again offers elaboration where other judges have been less explicit.
Niemeyer protested that allowing transgender students to use a bathroom that
aligns with their gender identity "overrules . . . the very demands inherent in
human nature for privacy and safety, which the separation of such facilities is
designed to protect.""' While the dissent conflates interests in accommodating
biological difference, preserving privacy, and protecting safety, it hints at what
the "safety" risk specifically entails. The dissent describes "safety concerns that
could arise from sexual responses prompted by students' exposure to the private
body parts of students of the other biological sex."' 54 The judge appears to be
voicing a concern-albeit euphemistically-about sexual vulnerability and
sexual assault. Perhaps, then, sex-segregated bathrooms serve the specific safety
interest of protecting people from sexual assault.
Although there is little other case law elaborating the safety interest in the
particular context of bathroom segregation, judges have more fully addressed a
similar safety interest in other forms of sex segregation. In Title VII suits
addressing sex-segregated prisons and hospital wards, for example, judges have
held sex to be a BFOQ because of concerns about safety, and more specifically
concerns about sexual assault. Understanding the reasoning in these opinions
may help illuminate judges' implicit beliefs about the safety interests
underpinning sex-segregated bathrooms-or at least highlight which safety
arguments about bathrooms will find most precedential support in courtrooms.
Perhaps the most significant case addressing this safety interest is Dothard
v. Rawlinson, in which the Supreme Court upheld a regulation barring women
from applying to be guards in a male prison. The Court hinged its analysis on
women's vulnerability to sexual assault: "The likelihood that inmates would
assault a woman because she was a woman would pose a real threat not only to
the victim of the assault but also to the basic control of the penitentiary and
protection of its inmates and the other security personnel." 55 In other words, the
151. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 751 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev'din
part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
152. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 622.
153. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 731 (4th Cir. 2016) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), vacated and
remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (U.S. Mar. 6,2017).
154. Id. at 735.
155. 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977).
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presence of a woman in the sex-segregated space of the male prison would
produce inevitable safety concerns for both sexes. Women would be faced with
the danger of becoming victims of sexual assault, and men would be faced with
the danger of disorder in the prison. The Court also seemed to suggest a "risk"
of men becoming sexual assailants. 15 6
This concern for the man who might commit sexual assault is detailed more
explicitly in Long v. State Personnel Board. The California court in Long held
that a woman could be barred from applying to be a chaplain in a male youth
prison."' A woman might not be suited to serve as a chaplain, the court
explained, because of the "danger from sexual attack." 158 Because "[i]t is women
who are generally raped, not men," this same danger did not exist for male
chaplains.1 5 9 While the court emphasized the danger of sexual assault for women,
however, its decision did not turn on this danger. Rather, the court was more
concerned with the "disastrous" "effect upon the [male] ward who succumbs to
temptation and commits the sexual offense." 6 0 Women's presence would not
only put them at risk of becoming victims but would also inevitably put men at
risk of becoming victims of their own unbridled sexuality. In Backus v. Baptist
Medical Center, a judge followed similar reasoning to justify barring men from
working in the obstetrics ward of a hospital: "a male nurse would necessitate the
presence of a female nurse to protect the hospital from charges of
molestation." 6 ' Here, it was a hospital, in addition to women and men, that
needed to be protected from men's sexuality.
In all of these cases, judges offer arguments that allowing the "wrong" sex
into strictly sex-segregated spaces would threaten the safety of both men and
women by increasing the risk of sexual assault. In doing so, the judges hold that
sex-segregated spaces serve two specific safety interests. First, sex-segregated
spaces protect women from sexual assault. Second, they protect at least some
men-and employers who hire men-from unbridled male heterosexuality,
which inevitably leads to sexual assault. Although these judges did not assert
these interests to justify sex-segregated bathrooms specifically, they offer helpful
elaborations of Judge Niemeyer's vague "safety concerns that could arise from
156. The Court's claim that the presence of a woman would threaten the "basic control" of the prison
because it is so "likel[y]" she would be assaulted suggests that the inmates' proclivity for sexual
violence is so extreme that only the absence of heterosexual temptation "protect[s]" the inmates from
succumbing to it. Id.
157. 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1003 (1974).
158. Id. at 1011.
159. Id. at 1011 n.6.
160. Id. at 1013. The judge here is not overtly saying that male nurses would assault patients, but rather
that the use of male nurses would subject the hospital to more allegations of sexual assault. The
implication that male nurses are more likely to commit assault-or at the very least more plausible
perpetrators of assault-in this environment, however, is nonetheless clear.
161. 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacatedon othergrounds, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
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sexual responses prompted by students' exposure to the private body parts of
students of the other biological sex."' 62
Analogizing judges' reasoning about safety interests in prison and hospital
cases to their reasoning about safety interests in the bathroom context is
particularly appropriate given judges' ascription of similar characteristics to all
of these sex-segregated spaces. In fact, it is the very characteristics that judges
suggest bathrooms share with sex-segregated prisons and hospital wards that
create a supposedly heightened risk of sexual assault in both contexts. In Long,
for example, the judge held that introduction of a female chaplain was
inappropriate in part because during her nighttime dormitory checks, the male
inmates might "not be particularly modest in their attire or lack of it." 63 The men
might also engage in private behavior that would "not be desirable or proper in
the presence of a woman."l64 The judge hints that one of these "undesirable"
behaviors might be sexual assault. Indeed, he describes assault as one of the
"danger[s]" that any woman "knows ... goes on in a male dormitory." 65 Here,
an increased likelihood of nudity, combined with the customary absence of
women-features common to sex-segregated bathrooms-increased the risk of
sexual assault.
Further, in Backus, male nurses were deemed inappropriate for the obstetrics
ward because "labor and delivery nurses perform intimate functions" and even
"non-intimate duties . . . involve the exposure of the patient's genitalia."166 The
risk of genital exposure is part of the reason that staffing male nurses would
require extra precautions "to curb any risk of a molestation charge."'l 6 7 A
heightened risk of genital exposure, which judges urge is also present in
bathrooms,' 68 creates an increased danger that sexual assault--or at least
plausible allegations of sexual assault-will follow.
Beyond highlighting the parallelism across judges' reasoning in the prison,
hospital, and bathroom contexts, cases such as Backus also allow one further
refinement of the safety interest at stake in sex-segregated facilities. In addition
to an interest in preventing sexual assault itself, judges assert that sex-segregated
facilities advance an interest in avoiding allegations of, and liability for, sexual
assault. In Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections, for example, the
court cited "allegations of sexual abuse, whether true or not, [which] create a
'poisoned atmosphere "l 69 as a reason in support of the exclusion of male guards
162. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 735 (4th Cir. 2016).
163. 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1010-11 (Ct. App. 1974).
164. Id. at 1011.
165. Id. at 1013.
166. 510 F. Supp. at 1193, 1197.
167. Id. at 1197.
168. See supra Part I.B.
169. 391 F.3d 737, 753 (6th Cir. 2004).
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from a women's prison. Judges have employed this logic in the bathroom context
as well. Remember that the Tenth Circuit held that the "concern" that "the use of
women's public restrooms by a biological male could result in liability ...
constitute[d] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the termination of
Krystal Etsitty.1 70 A Georgia court similarly held that "avoiding the cost of
lawsuits, even meritless suits, is a rational legitimate interest" reasonably
furthered by "terminating an employee with male genitalia who intends to ...
use women's restrooms." 7 1 Sex segregation in prisons, hospitals, and bathrooms
serves an interest not only in preventing sexual assault, it seems, but also in
reducing the perceived risk of sexual assault in locations where genital exposure
or nudity are ostensibly more likely.
This interest in avoiding allegations of assault can be reframed more
generously as an interest in creating spaces where clients will feel safer-
independent of whether they actually are safer. This interest, while it resembles
the privacy interest in preventing embarrassment or anxiety, is a distinct interest
in ensuring that people in potentially sexually vulnerable situations, such as an
obstetrics ward, prison, or bathroom, will feel as safe as possible in these
situations. Excluding male nurses from an obstetrics ward, for example, may not
be a "question [of] the credibility or reliability of a male nurse assisting a male
physician during the examination of a female patient,"172 but rather an attempt to
ensure that "the birth experience not only be positive but also be without
stress." 173 This attempt to create safe-feeling spaces is reflected in the Michigan
Department of Corrections's professed desire to avoid a "poisoned atmosphere"
in a women's prison by excluding male guards.1 74 Sex-segregated bathrooms
might similarly advance an interest in ensuring that bathrooms feel as safe and
stress-free as possible, regardless of whether it actually makes them safer.
Taken together, judges' and litigants' allusions to safety interests in the
bathroom context, and judges' more direct discussions of the safety interest in
other contexts of sex segregation, suggest that the safety interest supposedly
advanced by sex-segregated bathrooms is fundamentally linked to the risk of
sexual assault. This larger body of case law suggests that sex-segregated
bathrooms serve the safety interests of preventing women from becoming
victims of sexual assault and preventing men, driven by unbridled
heterosexuality, from committing sexual assault. Further, sex-segregated
bathrooms serve the interest of reducing the perception of risk of sexual assault,
regardless of whether they reduce actual risk.
170. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007).
171. Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2010), affd, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.
2011).
172. EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2,1982).
173. Id. at *5.
174. Everson v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737, 753 (6th Cir. 2004).
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III. THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS
Despite a lack of a clear legal challenge to sex-segregated bathrooms, then,
judges have nonetheless constructed some legal reasoning behind them. Judges
have developed specific interests related to biological difference, privacy, and
safety that seem to support a need for sex-segregated bathrooms. But this does
not mean that these interests would withstand a direct legal challenge. Sex-based
distinctions in the law, including laws and practices mandating sex-segregated
bathrooms, are generally subject to intermediate constitutional scrutiny. This
Part will explore whether the judicially asserted interests of privacy, safety, and
accommodation of biological difference would be sufficient grounds for
continued sex segregation of bathrooms in the face of intermediate constitutional
scrutiny.1'7 5
A. The Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
Generally, laws and policies that expressly classify individuals on the basis
of sex are subject to intermediate constitutional scrutiny.176 In order to survive
intermediate scrutiny, "classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."177 Intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications arises
from the recognition that "our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination" and that such "discrimination was rationalized by an attitude
of 'romantic paternalism' which . . . put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
cage."178 Intermediate scrutiny aids courts in invalidating discriminatory laws by
allowing judges to look more rigorously at a state's asserted purposes for a
classification and at the purported need to use a sex-based classification to
achieve those aims. While intermediate scrutiny does not forbid classifications
on the basis of gender entirely, it does forbid the use of such classifications "to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women."1 79
175. This Part will operate under the assumption that laws mandating sex-segregated bathrooms should,
indeed, be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Part IV will examine in greater depth whether sex-
segregated bathrooms might, in fact, be subject only to rational-basis review.
176. "Because the challenged policy expressly discriminates among applicants on the basis of gender, it
is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75
(1971)); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
177. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that
"the defender of the challenged action must show 'at least that the classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives"') (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982)).
178. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
179. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
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The first step in determining whether laws or policies mandating sex-
segregated bathrooms are constitutional is determining whether the "government
objective" or interest they profess to serve is "important." Indeed, the interest
must be "exceedingly persuasive.""so Any justification for employing a suspect
classification "must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in
response to litigation."'8 1 The classification "must not rely" on "overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of' certain
groups,182 even when these generalizations "enjoy empirical support." 8 3
Intermediate scrutiny forbids interests that rely on stereotypes, and any "statutory
objective" that "itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions . . . is
illegitimate."l 84 An interest in "exclud[ing] or 'protect[ing]' members of one
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior," for example, is not a legitimate interest under intermediate
scrutiny.185
Assuming the state can assert an important interest in segregating bathrooms
by sex, the second step in an intermediate-scrutiny evaluation is determining
whether sex-segregated bathrooms are "substantially related" to achieving that
interest. The substantial-relation requirement prevents states from employing the
"simplistic, outdated assumption that gender could be used as a 'proxy for other,
more germane bases of classification."'186 The "tighter fit between means and
ends" required by intermediate scrutiny provides that "the availability of sex-
neutral alternatives to a sex-based classification is often highly probative of the
validity of the classification."' 87 Thus, a state may not merely assert that sex
segregation in bathrooms serves an important interest. It bears the higher burden
of showing that sex segregation actually serves that interest better than other,
gender-neutral alternatives would.' 88
180. Id. at 524 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
181. Id. at 533.
182. Id.
183. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 76 (2001).
184. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
185. Id.
186. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726.
187. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78.
188. "[T]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State." United States. v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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B. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to the Judicially Asserted Interests
1. Accommodating Biological Differences
An evaluation of the alleged biological differences that sex-segregated
bathrooms might "accommodate" is an important first step in determining
whether bathrooms serve any constitutionally permissible interest. "Real"
biological differences have in fact served as an important limit on the Supreme
Court's sex-equality jurisprudence. Generally, the Court has upheld laws under
intermediate scrutiny when it perceives those laws to be founded on "actual
differences between men and women, as opposed to stereotypes of
differences." 18 9 In United States v. Virginia, for example, Justice Ginsburg wrote
that while "supposed 'inherent differences' are no longer accepted as a ground
for race or national origin classifications . .. [p]hysical differences between men
and women" might justify differential treatment. 190 In Nguyen v. INS, the Court
upheld a sex-based distinction in immigration law based on such a "biological
difference" between men and women, namely women's unavoidable presence at
childbirth.191 If sex-segregated bathrooms accommodate real biological
differences, then, they could be found to be constitutional.
Sex segregation in bathrooms, however, does not accommodate any real
biological differences: even if we take biological difference for granted
(pretending, for instance, that transgender or intersex people do not use the
bathroom) it is not obvious that biological difference should lead to sex
segregation. As Erving Goffman has noted, while "the functioning of sex-
differentiated organs is involved," when we use the bathroom, "there is nothing
in this functioning that biologically recommends segregation."' 92 This should be
readily apparent to any person who has used a restroom in a private home-such
facilities accommodate both men and women every day. This is also true of
unisex single-stall public facilities. When the district court judge in the G. G. case
suggested that "[r]estrooms ... are designed differently because of the biological
differences between the sexes," the only evidence he pointed to was the fact that
189. Cohen, supra note 47, at 104 (providing many examples of the court allowing for "real" differences
between men and women in the law). See also CATHARINE MAcKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 216 (1989) ("Difference defines the state's approach to sex equality ....
The deepest issues of sex inequality, in which the sexes are most constructed as socially different,
are either excluded at the threshold or precluded from coverage once in. In this way, difference is
inscribed on society as the meaning of gender and written into law as the limit on sex
discrimination.").
190. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
191. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 64.
192. Spencer E. Cahill et al., Meanwhile Backstage: Public Bathrooms and the Interaction Order, 14
URBAN LIFE 33, 54 (1985).
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"[m]ale restrooms . . . contain urinals, while female restrooms do not."1 9 3 Yet
urinals are clearly not a biological necessity; they are-as the judge admits-a
"convenience."l94
Even this claim to "convenience" stems from stereotypes about biological
difference rather than from biological differences themselves. While many men
do prefer urinals, other men have medical conditions, such as parureris, or "shy
bladder syndrome," that turn urinals into a substantial barrier to public restroom
use.195 Other men simply find urinals embarrassing.1 96 Even if men's preference
for urinals were biologically immutable, the sex segregation of restrooms would
not be substantially related to accommodating this need. There is nothing
biological preventing urinals and toilets from being made available in the same
unisex bathroom.1 97
Other notions of "biological difference" supporting sex segregation more
obviously rely on stereotypes. Some opponents of increasingly prevalent unisex
bathrooms, for example, suggest that sex-segregated bathrooms are essential
because men are inherently dirtier. 19 8 The link to biology appears to be that "men
stand to urinate and at times might not aim accurately."' 99 If it is not clear on its
face that such claims rely on stereotypes about the "talents, capacities, or
193. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 750 (E.D. Va. 2015), rev'd in
part, vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
194. Id.
195. As many as "17 million Americans, or about 7 percent of the U.S. population," suffer from some
degree of paruresis. Ninety percent of those who seek treatment are male. Urinals can present
significant barriers to using public restrooms for these men. STEVEN SOIFER ET AL., SHY BLADDER
SYNDROME: YOUR STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO OVERCOMING PARURESIS 6-7 (2001).
196. One psychologist has written, for example, that "[a]gain and again over the years, and not in small
numbers, men have confided to me that they find urinals anxiety-provoking-even humiliating."
Keith Ablow, What Men Really Think About Urinals, Fox NEWS, May 6, 2011, http://www.foxnews
.com/health/2011/05/06/men-really-think-urinals.html [https://perma.cc/N5VG-MNCN].
197. Indeed, many public men's restrooms contain both urinals and unisex toilets. That these facilities
are not seen to accommodate both men and women is a matter of privacy-due to a lack of stalls
around urinals-rather than biology. See discussion infra Part III.B.ii.
198. See, e.g., Charlotte Allen, Privacy Down the Toilet, NAT. REV., Nov. 3, 2014, https://www
.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/390465/privacy-down-toilet [https://perma.cc/CJK5-QG5M]
("Women are simply more fastidious than men about the physical circumstances in which we do our
business. We highly value cleanliness and privacy.").
199. Ian Ayres, Looking Out for No. 2: A Modest Proposalfor Single-Use Toilets, SLATE, Mar. 7, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/jurisprudence/2005/03/lookingout for no2.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/MP5Z-ZP4C].
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preferences" of men and women,200 both anecdotal 20 1 and scientific 202 evidence
demonstrates that women's restrooms are often dirtier than men's restrooms.
Another biology-linked claim sometimes invoked to defend sex-segregated
bathrooms is the fact that women take longer to use the restroom. While evidence
does suggest that women spend longer in the bathroom, 203 evidence also suggests
that this has as much to do with social factors-such as women's apparel,204 the
awkwardness of toilet stalls, and women's responsibility for children in the
bathroom 20 5-than with biology. Even if biology were the single driving factor
behind cisgender women's relative longer times in the restroom, sex-segregated
bathrooms would seem to exacerbate this problem by inefficiently isolating the
"slowest" users from the "fastest" users. 206
In conclusion, accommodating biological differences should not be
considered an important state interest, largely because these "differences" are
often based on stereotypes rather than reality. Even if the differences do exist,
sex segregation is not substantially related to accommodating them. Indeed,
segregation often exacerbates inequities in access for women. As such, an
interest in accommodating biological difference almost certainly fails
intermediate scrutiny, which perhaps explains why judges almost never assert
this interest. Ultimately, while biological differences might seem a "common
sense" answer to why bathrooms should be sex-segregated, it is clear that "[a]t
the heart of the issue are not the genitalia themselves of the users, nor the
differences between male and female genitalia, but rather the significance of the
200. "The deeper justification must be not only that some men are messy but that men as a class aren't
as sensitive as women are to the messiness. But this is just the type of unsupported sexual
stereotyping that our discrimination law was meant to stop." Id.
201. Mary Schimich, Sharing Bathroom with Men Raises Question of Cleanliness, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29,
2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/schmich/ct-gender-neutral-bathroom-mary
-schniich-0129-20160128-column.html [https://perma.cc/ELD6-NMAN] (describing interviews
with professional cleaners who reported the "women's room, hands down," as dirtier than the men's
room).
202. Wendy Marston, Scientist at Work: Charles Gerba; On Germ Patrol, at the Kitchen Sink, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/23/health/scientist-at-work-charles-gerba-
on-germ-patrol-at-the-kitchen-sink.html [https://perma.cc/VN26-D8DQ] ("He discovered which
sex had dirtier bathrooms (women, by far) . . . .").
203. Case, supra note 70, at 213. ("Studies carried out by researchers do offer some statistics in support
of the assumption that women take longer . .. in the restroom.").
204. Id. ("Whereas pantyhose slow women down, for example, the zipper front and center on a typical
pair of pants only facilitates male urination.").
205. Clara Greed, Creating a NonsexistRestroom, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF
SHARING 117, 119 (Harvey Moltoch & Laura Noren eds., 2010).
206. Case, supra note 70, at 218 ("Basic queuing theory confirms that making fully enclosed single-user
facilities available to either sex on demand, as airplane toilets are, would cut down on overall waiting
times and promote the most efficient use of available toilet facilities."). Sex segregation has often,
in fact, operated to ensure that the "slowest" users have the fewest facilities to use: "Even if the floor
space provided for the ladies' and men's rooms is of equal size, men are likely to have twice the
places to pee because they will have stalls plus a row of urinals along the wall-hence the queues,
where women patiently stand in line." Id. at 118.
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genitalia in social and political terms." 2 07 Included in this social meaning are
privacy and safety concerns, to which this Note now turns.
2. Privacy
If the sex segregation of bathrooms is intended to protect a general privacy
interest, it is doing a very poor job of it. Sex-segregated public restrooms
generally fail to protect one's privacy from members of the same sex, and we
generally do not expect them to.208 As they are currently designed, restrooms are
a place where people cannot avoid becoming aware of others' bodily functions,
or having others become aware of their bodily functions, through sight, sound,
and smell. This is particularly true for people who use urinals. A generalized,
gender-neutral privacy interest, even if "important," would thus provide little
support for sex segregation of bathrooms. As discussed supra in Part II, however,
the privacy interest that judges assert in support of sex-segregated bathrooms is
not as expansive as this. Rather, it is a specific interest in avoiding the
embarrassment, stress, or shame caused by unwanted exposure of one's body or
bodily functions to members of the opposite sex--or exposure to such bodies
and functions. This Note argues, however, that this interest still does not justify
sex-segregated bathrooms in the face of intermediate scrutiny, even for cisgender
people, primarily because the interest relies on mere stereotypes about men and
women.
A state asserting that bathrooms protect a privacy interest that exists only in
relation to the "opposite sex" is necessarily asserting that there will be greater
embarrassment, stress, or shame caused by exposure of one's body or bodily
functions to members of the opposite sex than to members of one's own sex. Part
of this claim, as hinted at by Judge Niemeyer's allusion to potential "sexual
responses prompted by students' exposure to the private body parts of students
of the other biological sex," 209 is undoubtedly rooted in notions of sexuality.2 10
While different genitalia themselves may not demand segregation, perhaps
heterosexuality does. As one scholar has framed it, sex-segregated bathrooms
might protect privacy by allowing one to "shield[] oneself, during the
207. Overall, supra note 16, at 75.
208. See Susan E. Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329, 370 (1999). ("[T]he term "public restroom" is something of an
oxymoron . . . because one is required to share it with others, a public or workplace restroom is
someplace where one has a limited expectation of privacy.").
209. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 735 (4th Cir. 2016) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. As one scholar has suggested, the sex segregation of bathrooms seems to advance an interest in "the
maintenance of that sense of mystery or forbiddenness about the other sex's sexuality . . . ." Antony,
supra note 92, at 5 (quoting Richard Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 594 (1977), excerpted in PHILOSOPHY AND WOMEN
5, 10 (Sharon Bishop & Marjorie Weinzweig eds., 1979)).
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performance of elimination, from members of the group of individuals to whom
one is, was, or will be sexually attracted and with whom one might ordinarily
engage in or want to engage in or once have engagedin sexual activities."211
This reasoning, however, does not hold up to any real scrutiny. Even if a
state has an important interest in helping people maintain their sexual allure by
preventing others from becoming aware of their bodily functions, sex
segregation is not substantially related to achieving this end for many people.
While a majority of people are sexually attracted to members of the opposite sex,
many are sexually attracted to members of the same sex. Positing that sex
segregation solves the problem of sexuality-related embarrassment in the
bathroom relies on assumptions of heterosexuality212 and thus "overbroad
generalizations about the ... preferences of" men and women.213 Indeed, if we
accepted that bathrooms served an important privacy interest in preventing
sexuality-based embarrassment, single-sex bathrooms would constitute a gross
privacy violation for those attracted to members of the same sex. The fact that
"lesbians and gay men manage to use sex-segregated toilets," despite the
possibility of being sexually interested in someone they share the bathroom with,
reveals that a privacy interest based on sexuality is not so important.214
Some might object that sex-segregated restrooms' failure to serve the
sexuality-linked privacy concerns of gay and lesbian individuals does little to
undermine their substantial relation to sexuality-linked privacy concerns more
generally. Most courts, including the Supreme Court, have not endorsed a
constitutional theory of sex discrimination that forbids discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. Even as it struck down a law targeting gay, lesbian,
and bisexual individuals in Romer v. Evans, for example, the Supreme Court did
so under a rational-basis review rather than under heightened scrutiny.215 Neither
Windsor nor Obergefell, both Supreme Court cases that extended marriage
equality to sexual minorities, did so on the grounds that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.21 6 As such, sex-
211. Overall, supra note 16, at 80.
212. "The separation [of women's and men's bathrooms] ignores same-sex sexuality .... [W]omen's
and men's bathrooms assume heterosexuality and the existence of only two sexes . . . ." Patricia
Cooper & Ruth Oldenziel, Cherished Classifications: Bathrooms and the Construction of
Gender/Race on the Pennsylvania Railroad During World War I, 25 FEMINIST STUD. 7,26 (1999).
213. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
214. Overall, supra note 16, at 80 (explaining that if sexuality were a vital part of the privacy interest
protected by bathrooms, "current toilet arrangements are, for lesbians and gay men, mightily
inconvenient and inappropriate" and noting that "[njonetheless, lesbians and gay men manage to use
sex-segregated toilets.").
215. 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
216. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603-05 (2015) (identifying the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage as a violation of mutually dependent liberty and equality interests rather than
as a form of sex-based discrimination); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-96 (2013)
(striking down the Defense of Marriage Act on the grounds of evidence of animus and
unconstitutional interference with liberty interests rather than of improper sex-based discrimination).
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segregated restrooms' reliance on assumptions of heterosexuality might not be
of concern in a constitutional sex-discrimination analysis.
Recent litigation in the Title VII context, however, suggests that courts are
beginning to understand discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a
form of sex discrimination. Last year, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that
employment "discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination" prohibited by Title VII. 2 17 The court relied in part on the theory
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation fundamentally relies on sex-
based stereotypes: "[the lesbian plaintiff] represents the ultimate case of failure
to conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as
modern America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms of
sexuality as exceptional): she is not heterosexual." 2 18 The EEOC has endorsed a
similar theory of sexual-orientation discrimination as sex discrimination since
2015,219 and the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit asserted this same theory in a
recent Title VII case.220
Although Title VII analysis is distinct from constitutional sex-discrimination
analysis, these courts provide a theory for understanding presumptions of
heterosexuality as constitutionally forbidden sex-based stereotypes and
"overbroad generalizations about the ... preferences of' men and women.22 '
Justice Kennedy's assertion in Obergefell that our constitutional order can evolve
to encompass broader protections for sexual minorities suggests that courts may
increasingly understand assumptions about heterosexuality as at odds not only
with Title VII, but also with the Constitution's prohibition of sex discrimination.
The Eleventh222 and Seventh223 Circuits, for example, have already moved
towards a more expansive understanding of constitutional sex discrimination,
recently holding that discrimination against transgender individuals is subject to
heightened scrutiny as a form of sex discrimination. At the very least, evidence
of courts' broadening understanding of protections for gender and sexual
minorities-and of what constitutes sex discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution-supports a modest point: assumptions about heterosexuality alone
217. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017).
218. Id. at 346.
219. Baldwin v. Dep't of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015) (asserting, in part, that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is sex-based discrimination because it represents
discrimination based on gender stereotypes about which kinds of people men and women should be
romantically attracted to).
220. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2017) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring).
221. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
222. In Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh Circuit held that discrimination against transgender employees
constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Constitution and is thus "subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause." 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011).
223. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., No. 16-3522 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that transgender
discrimination is subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny as per-se sex-based discrimination).
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are shaky ground for the overt sex-based discrimination presented by sex-
segregated restrooms.
Judges' assertions that people have a special privacy interest against the
opposite sex, however, certainly do not rely on sexuality alone. They more often
rest on cultural norms. As one court put it, "exposure of [the] nude body and
bodily functions . .. within the perceptive range of strangers of the opposite sex
. . . clashes with a deeply held social, moral and emotional bias pervading
Western culture." 224 As another urged, a heightened need for privacy around the
opposite sex is "a cultural thing." 225 Because of the ubiquity of "segregated toilet
facilities in public places which children are early taught to use," Americans have
developed a greater need for privacy in the presence of the opposite sex, and
"[tihe fact that a need for privacy is the product of social conditioning makes it
no less embarrassing or occasions no less feeling of shame." 226 As Judge Posner
poignantly urged in his dissent to Johnson v. Phelan, failing to respect this social
"reality" may fail to respect individuals' very humanity. 2 27 It is this cultural and
psychological violation that also seemed to animate the Carcaho court's
conjuring of the 12-year-old girl exposed to "mature" "male genitalia." 22 8 Thus,
even if there are no biological or sexual differences that produce an important
sex-specific privacy interest, perhaps there are important social differences that
do.
Acknowledging cultural realities, however, does not mean accepting that
protecting people from the embarrassment of exposure to members of the
opposite sex is an important government interest for the purposes of intermediate
scrutiny. The Second Circuit articulated this idea when it struck down a statute
barring women from exposing their breasts in public: "[a]lthough protecting
public sensibilities is a generally legitimate goal for legislation, . . . it is a tenuous
basis for justifying a legislative classification that is based on gender, race or any
other grouping that is associated with a history of social prejudice." 2 29 Indeed,
this is why sex-based classifications are subject to heightened, rather than
rational-basis, scrutiny. Our sex-discrimination jurisprudence recognizes that
cultural norms often "reflect[] archaic and stereotypic notions" that are usually
not a legitimate basis for laws that discriminate between men and women.230
224. In re Long, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736 (Ct. App. 1976).
225. Local 567 Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees v. Michigan Council 25, Am. Fed'n of
State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, 635 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
226. Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.
1980).
227. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 155 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
228. Carcaiio v. McCrory, 203 F. Supp. 3d 615, 644 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
229. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 236 (N.Y. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
230. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
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In other words, while a culturally derived privacy interest might be enough
to sustain a non-suspect classification, it is likely not enough to support sex-
segregated bathrooms. The Supreme Court rejected just this kind of interest in
United States v. Virginia. There, VMI tried to argue that "female participation in
VMI's adversative training 'would destroy ... any sense of decency that still
permeates the relationship between the sexes."' 231 Justice Ginsburg quickly
dispatched this concern as "an ancient and familiar fear" that has been used to
perpetuate women's exclusion, and as insufficient to sustain VMIl's male-only
admissions policy. 2 32 Justice Ginsburg is correct-arguments about cultural
propriety and embarrassment have been used to justify now-archaic sex-based
segregation in many places, such as swimming pools233 and bars.234
Even if we did not have historical reasons to doubt cultural privacy norms
as an important reason for segregating the sexes, we may doubt their ubiquity
today. Many people do not feel their privacy is invaded by the presence of the
opposite sex in the bathroom, demonstrating the degree to which sex segregation
relies on "overbroad generalizations about the . .. preferences of' men and
women. 23 5 People with disabilities, for example, may daily use the restroom with
the assistance of an opposite-sex attendant.2 36 Parents with children of a different
sex often bring these children into the bathroom with them without raising
privacy concerns. 2 37 Even if most people might prefer extra privacy from the
"opposite" sex in restrooms, U.S. v. Virginia held that "estimates of what is
appropriate for most women" or "most men" are not important enough to sustain
sex-based discrimination in law.238
The existence of people who feel that their privacy is invaded by observation
by members of the same sex further undercuts the importance of the opposite-
sex privacy interest. Recognizing that some people might become anxious at the
prospect of any maintenance person entering a restroom or locker room while
they are using it demonstrates just how tenuous-if not overtly harmful-a sex-
specific privacy interest really is. This revelation is perhaps best illustrated by a
return to Judge Posner's dissent in Johnson v. Phelan. In his dissent, Judge
231. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 528 (1996) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229,
1239 (4th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in original).
232. Id. at 555 n.20.
233. Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (No. 16-273)
("Because of [a] combination of factors-bodily exposure, physical contact, and difficulty of
surveillance-public officials demanded that males and females swim separately.") (quoting JEFF
WILTSE, CONTESTED WATERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SWIMMING POOLS IN AMERICA 2 (2007)).
234. Hickey, supra note 51, at 382 (describing how cultural norms, notions of privacy, and "common
sense" were all used as justifications for the maintenance of male-only bars and clubs).
235. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
236. Gershenson & Penner, supra note 22, at 7.
237. Id.
238. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550.
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Posner goes to great lengths to scapegoat "radical feminists"' and their "blind"
pursuit of equality as driving the psychologically traumatizing surveillance of a
deeply vulnerable group of people-incarcerated individuals.23 9 If feminists
respected socially-derived opposite-sex privacy interests, the argument goes,
prisoners would no longer experience such drastic invasions of privacy.
This opinion's staunch focus on the indignity of opposite-sex observation,
however, obscures the fundamental privacy issue at stake in this case-pervasive
surveillance of any kind. As Judge Posner notes, "to place male prisoners under
continuous visual surveillance by female guards ... so that whenever the
prisoner dresses or undresses, takes a shower, or uses the toilet, a woman is
watching him, gives even my colleagues pause." 24 0 Yet, replacing "female" and
"woman" with "male" and "man" in this sentence-Judge Posner's solution to
this indignity-seems no less worthy of pause. Suggesting that the provision of
same-sex guards would remedy the privacy concerns at stake in this case clearly
"underestimate[s] the extent to which observation and surveillance are their own
manifestations of power, regardless of the sex of the participants. "241 If opposite-
sex observation is really cruel and unusual under these conditions, it is difficult
to understand how same-sex observation under the same conditions is entirely
acceptable.
Fundamentally, Posner's superficial solution to the privacy problem
presented in Phelan-sex-segregated prison guards-demonstrates the degree to
which alleged opposite-sex privacy interests often undercut more general privacy
needs. It is only a single-minded focus on sex-specific privacy that allows sex
segregation to appear a plausible solution to problems that cannot possibly be
solved by segregation alone. It is this narrow focus that causes litigants to balk
at the notion of an adult forcibly exposing himself to a 12-year-old girl but not
to a 12-year-old boy. This double standard applies in even the most "extreme"
prison scenarios, such as body-cavity searches by guards. By focusing on the sex
of the searcher as the defining factor of whether a search violates prisoners'
privacy, judges avoid the far more significant question of whether searches by
guards-rather than, say, by medical professionals-are appropriate at all. This
applies in more benign scenarios as well, such as hospital wards, where focusing
on the sex of nurses or doctors can obscure factors far more important to privacy,
such as consent. 24 2 Culturally or "reality"-based opposite-sex privacy interests
239. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152, 155 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
240. Id. at 154.
241. Sharon M. McGowan, The Bona Fide Body: Title VII's Last Bastion of Intentional Sex
Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 101 (2003).
242. As Amy Kapczynski has suggested, "Patients may have an underlying privacy right not to be
exposed to the view of others, particularly nonmedical personnel, without their consent, but once
again, consent is primary, and sex plays no legally decisive role in the matter." Amy Kapczynski,
Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits ofAntidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1269 (2003).
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are therefore likely to undercut privacy as a general matter. Although they are
often framed as common-sense appeals to our very humanity, opposite-sex
privacy interests are ultimately too weak a concept to support differential
treatment based on sex.
Without biology, sexuality, or culture producing an important sex-specific
privacy interest, it is unclear what important privacy interest sex segregation of
bathrooms do serve. Even if a state could successfully establish an important sex-
specific privacy interest, however, sex-segregated bathrooms should nonetheless
fail under the substantial-relation prong of intermediate scrutiny. Remember that
the judicially constructed privacy interest in bathroom segregation seeks to
prevent embarrassment arising from two risks: bodily exposure and bodily-
function exposure. Sex-neutral alternatives to bathroom segregation could do an
equally good, if not better, job of preventing both of these risks. As the Supreme
Court has articulated, "the availability of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based
classification is often highly probative of the validity of the classification." 243 In
other words, it does not matter if there is a heightened privacy interest against
the other sex when this interest could be equally served by a gender-neutral
solution.
As for the first privacy interest, the interest in preventing bodily exposure,
this risk is already essentially absent from women's restrooms. The existence of
stalls, which prevent all people from seeing each other in states of undress, means
that women's rooms could already be cheaply converted into unisex restrooms.
The risk of exposure in men's rooms, generated by urinals, could easily be
remedied by the placement of additional stalls around urinals. Co-ed bathrooms
designed much in this way already pervade university campuses.244 Integrated
bathrooms with this level of privacy might in fact be welcome to many men, such
as those with shy bladder syndrome, who desire increased privacy.245
Some might object that this design would not successfully preserve privacy
becausepeople-particularly men-might attempt to look over or under stalls.
Further, open stalls would not protect people from the second privacy risk of
exposing bodily functions to others through sound or smell. But even this
punctilious notion of privacy could be remedied by the introduction of floor-to-
ceiling stalls. Bathrooms using floor-to-ceiling stalls are already the norm in
243. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 78 (2001).
244. See Anthony & Dufresne, supra note 33, at 282-83 (naming some educational institutions with
bathrooms designed this way); Francesca Gailia, Most People Have All-Gender Restrooms at Home.
Why Not Have Them Everywhere?, TRUTHOUT, Dec. 9, 2016, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item
/38679-most-people-have-all-gender-restrooms-at-home-why-not-have-them-everywhere
(describing more contemporary institutional additions to the movement). The author of this Note
used one such facility as an undergraduate at Yale University.
245. Case, supra note 70, at 217 ("Ending sex segregation in the toilets need not mean a loss of privacy
for women. It could instead offer increased privacy to men, something that could appeal at least to
those men who suffer from pee-shy, a pathological inability to urinate easily when at risk of being
observed, as at the urinals in a public toilet.").
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many European countries 24 6 and are becoming increasingly common in many
places in the United States, including restaurants, clubs, and art galleries. 247
While redesigning extant facilities to meet these requirements might be costly,
cost has generally not been a successful defense of sex discrimination in Title
VII cases, and the ADA has already required institutions to incur significant costs
to prevent discrimination. 2 48 Further, with respect to new buildings, gender-
neutral bathrooms are often cheaper to build than separate restrooms and so could
actually save money.249
Finally, the fact that gender-neutral solutions would better serve privacy
interests than sex-segregated bathrooms is the strongest refutation of judges'
appeals to social "reality" as a reason for maintaining sex-segregated facilities in
general. While judges such as Judge Posner would pit feminists' push for sex
equality against the needs of vulnerable individuals such as prisoners, gender-
neutral solutions that promote both equality and privacy undermine this attempt
to scapegoat sex equality. Certainly, being observed while changing or using the
toilet is troubling to many people. Many men might be sincerely troubled by the
prospect of a maintenance person bursting into the bathroom unexpectedly while
they are at a urinal. Many parents might be nervous about an adult exposing
themselves to their child in the bathroom. What is troubling about these
scenarios, however, has little to do with sex and much more to do with privacy
as a general matter. Abandoning notions that sex segregation is the exclusive, or
even the most effective, means of addressing such privacy concerns allows us to
address privacy concerns with solutions that are far more responsive to reality.
Therefore, sex-segregated bathrooms, if premised only on privacy concerns,
should not pass intermediate scrutiny. This is true when the asserted piivacy
interest is general and particularly true when it is sex-specific. Stereotypes about
biological or sexual differences, as well as stereotypes about men and women's
social preferences, cannot form the foundation of an important state interest.
Even if there were an important sex-specific privacy interest, the availability of
practical, sex-neutral alternatives reveals that sex segregation is not substantially
related to that interest.
246. Overall, supra note 16, at 80.
247. Joel Sanders & Susan Stryker, Stalled: Gender-Neutral Public Bathrooms, 115 S. ATLANTIC Q. 779,
783 (2016) (describing the design and use of gender-neutral bathrooms in a number of places in the
United States, including in the New York Museum of Modern Art).
248. See Sarah A. Moore, Facility Hostility? Sex Discrimination and Women's Restrooms in the
Workplace, 36 GA. L. REv. 599, 627-28 (2002).
249. Anthony & Dufresne, supra note 33, at 287 ("[P]lanners and city officials should view free-standing,
gender-neutral, unisex restrooms as potential cost savers compared to traditional gender-segregated
design. When well planned, designed, managed, and maintained, they can save strapped city budgets
considerable funds.").
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3. Safety
Outside of privacy, protecting safety is the most plausible interest justifying
sex-segregated bathrooms. As with privacy, however, the importance of this
safety interest is undermined by the fact that it is sex-specific. Remember that
judges assert sex segregation not as a means of protecting safety generally, but
instead as a means of preventing a particularly gendered form of sexual assault.
Judges seem to suggest that sex segregation helps prevent women from becoming
victims of, and men from perpetrating, sexual assault.
Fundamentally, a safety interest in protecting only women from sexual
assault relies on impermissible stereotypes about men and women. Indeed, the
Supreme Court used such women-protective arguments as a quintessential
example of an interest that "reflects archaic and stereotypic notions" in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.2 50 The Court asserted that if a state's
objective is to 'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed to
suffer from an inherent handicap . .. the objective itself is illegitimate."251 While
it may be true, as one judge held, that "[i]t is women who are generally raped,
not men," 252 this-as the word "generally" suggests-is a generalization. Studies
have estimated that one out of ten victims of rape are male2 5 3 and that thirty-eight
percent of victims of sexual violence are men.25 4 Rates of sexual assault among
men are still higher among young men and boys. 2 55 While the exact numbers
vary depending on the study and methodology, men and boys clearly can be and
often are victims of sexual assault. Studies also show that men are not the only
perpetrators of sexual assault.256
Evidence thus demonstrates that an interest in protecting women alone from
sexual assault by a presumptively male assaulter relies on nothing more than
stereotypes that women are sexually assaulted while men are not, and that men
commit sexual assault while women do not. 257 Even if the risk of sexual assault
250. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
251. Id.
252. Long v. State Pers. Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 1011 n.6 (1974).
253. Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-
. violence [https://perma.cc/TZM3-L5GN] (last visited Dec. 9, 2017).
254. Conor Friedersdorf, The Understudied Female Sexual Predator, ATLANTIC, Nov. 28, 2016, https://
www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/1 1/the-understudied-female-sexiual-predator/503492
[https://perma.cc/3BT2-X4J5]; Hanna Rosin, When Men Are Raped, SLATE, Apr. 29, 2014,
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/04/male rapein america a newstudy
revealsthatmenaresexually assaulted.html [https://perma.cc/7FZX-VP6B].
255. NAT'L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., STATISTICS ABOUT SEXUAL ASSAULT (2015), available at
http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications-nsvrc-factsheet-media-packet-statistics-
about-sexual-violence 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPA8-AYPE].
256. See Friedersdorf, supra note 254 (describing a number of studies demonstrating evidence that
women commit a significant number of sexual assaults against men).
257. For a discussion of courts' stereotypical treatment of women's "rapability," see MACKINNON, supra
note 189, at 226.
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is greater for women, "overbroad sex-based generalizations are impermissible"
as a basis for legislation "even when they enjoy empirical support." 2 58 Further,
the Supreme Court has suggested in other contexts that stereotypes about
women's sexual vulnerability as justification for segregation are insufficient in
the face of constitutional scrutiny. 2 59 Extensive Title VII precedent, holding that
generalized concerns about women's safety are not an acceptable basis for
denying women jobs, further weighs in favor of this conclusion.2 6 0 An interest in
women's safety from sexual assault is thus unlikely to support sex segregation
in bathrooms, even if women generally are more sexually vulnerable than men.
The interest in avoiding allegations of, or liability for, sexual assault fares
no better as an important justification for sex segregation. Admittedly, this
interest does not necessarily rely on stereotypes about men and women's relative
sexual vulnerability or aggression; an employer might think male employees are
no more dangerous than female ones but still exclude them in the name of
creating a safe space for women who feel less safe around men.26 1 Nonetheless,
such liability avoidance or safe space-protective interests rely on alternative
stereotypes about men and women's comfort in sex-integrated facilities. These
stereotypes resemble those which insufficiently support an opposite-sex privacy
interest-namely, that women feel "safer" around other women as a matter of
sexuality, culture, or biology. 2 62
The Eleventh Circuit, for this reason, looked dubiously upon the importance
of the imputed comfort of customers when an employer attempted to use it as a
reason for firing a transgender employee. 263 The court urged that while
258. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 76 (2001).
259. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976), for example, the Court overruled Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), which had upheld a Michigan law that forbade women, other than
wives and daughters of the male bar owners, from working in the male spaces of bars. In doing so
the Court rejected Michigan's reasoning that such a law was justified because "the oversight assured
through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront
a barmaid without such protecting oversight." Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466. These "moral and social"
dangers, id., almost certainly referred in part to unwanted or inappropriate sexual advances or
assault.
260. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202 (1991) (chronicling case law demonstrating
that "discrimination on the basis of sex because of safety concerns is allowed only in narrow
circumstances" and that such circumstances do not include concern for women's safety alone);
Green v. Waterford Bd. of Ed., 473 F.2d 629, 635 (2d Cir. 1973) (dismissing heightened safety
concerns as a valid reason for discriminating against pregnant teachers); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that stereotypes about whether women can
safely perform a job cannot form the basis for denying them that job).
261. As the hospital in E.E.O. C. v. Mercy Health Center put it, keeping men out of the obstetrics ward
was not a "question [of] the credibility or reliability of a male nurse assisting a male physician during
the examination of a female patient." No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 WL 3108, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb.
2, 1982). The hospital may trust its male nurses entirely or not believe male nurses to be more
sexually aggressive but still exclude them in the name of creating a perceived safe space for women
who nonetheless felt unsafe around men. Id.
262. See supra Part III.B.
263. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
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"purported concern that women might object to [the plaintiffs] restroom use"
was "conceivable," it was ultimately unlikely.264 The court was so skeptical of
this interest, in fact, that it characterized it as "hypothesized or invented post hoc
in response to litigation. "265 le ssumptions about the litigiousness of women
faced with "unsafe" sex-integrated bathrooms might be a "conceivable" interest
supporting their segregation, this interest should not hold up to intermediate
scrutiny.
Once again, even if a particular safety interest in protecting women from
sexual assault, or from fears of sexual assault, did not rely on stereotypes and
were "important" for purposes of intermediate scrutiny, sex-segregated
bathrooms would not be substantially related to forwarding these interests. In
their current form, sex-segregated bathrooms are not particularly safe spaces for
women.266 The point is illustrated by Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, where the
Supreme Court found that a man following his employee into the women's
bathroom and exposing himself to her contributed to a cognizable claim of sex
discrimination.26 Evidently a sign with a skirt was not enough to keep
determined harassers out of women's rooms. Countless news stories of women
assaulted by men in women's bathrooms likewise demonstrate that such signs do
not deter sexual assailants.2 68
In addition to posing a dubious barrier to sexual assault, sex-segregated
bathrooms may actually increase the likelihood of assault. If we accept the
stereotype that women are victims of sexual assault and men are perpetrators,
sex segregation isolates potential victims in the women's room and indicates to
male assailants where they can find them.269 Further, by decreasing the number
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
266. Case, supra note 70, at 220 (making "the anecdotal observation that an awful lot of male-on-female
crime already takes place in the supposedly safe space of the women's room").
267. 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1987) (cited in Case, supra note 70, at 220, as evidence that women's rooms are
not safe for women).
268. See, e.g., Sara J. Green, Sex Offender Hid in Golden Gardens Restroom Aiming to Rape Woman,
Charges Say, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 2017, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/sex-
offender-hid-in-golden-gardens-restroom-aiming-to-rape-woman-charges-say/ [https://perma.cc
/2PVS-BUEN] (describing a man who hid in the women's restroom waiting for a woman he could
assault); Jorge Milian, Man Allegedly Raped Girl, 13, in Church During Funeral, PALM BEACH
POST, Mar. 7, 2017, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/crime--law/just-man-allegedly-raped-
girl-church-during-funeral/yATo2ZNJXWBxDgaCskv4fK [https://perma.cc/NR2P-4VG7]
(describing an incident of a man raping a girl in a women's restroom); Rape Reported at Viejas RV,
Fox 5 SAN DIEGO, Nov. 16, 2016, http://fox5sandiego.com/2016/11/16/rape-reported-at-rv-park-
on-viejas-indian-reservation [https://perma.cc/Q6WD-KH3V] (describing a man raping a woman in
a bathroom stall); Man Accused ofPeeping on Women in Ladies Restrooms, Attempted Rape, KOCO
5 NEWS, Aug. 8, 2016, http://www.koco.com/article/man-accused-of-peeping-on-women-in-ladies-
restrooms-attempted-rape/4310999 [https://perma.cc/AJJ8-M4BG] (describing a man who both
"peeped" on and attempted to assault women in the women's room).
269. Overall, supra note 16, at 82 ("[A] would-be assailant has a reasonable expectation that he will find




of people in any bathroom at any given time, sex-segregated bathrooms may
make assault more likely by increasing the likelihood that a woman will find
herself alone.2 70 Integrated bathrooms, by "increasing bathroom occupancy,"
would seem to far more successfully "reduce[] risks of predation associated with
being alone and out of sight."27 1
Finally, compared to sex-segregated bathrooms, gender-neutral bathrooms
would likely better protect against sexual assault by members of the same sex.
Indeed, if we reject the stereotype that men cannot be assaulted by men, or
women by women, we quickly see that sex segregation cannot be an effective
solution to a general interest in preventing sexual assault. As too-frequent news
stories of boys assaulted in men's bathrooms demonstrate,272 any person could
derive safety benefits from a decreased chance of being alone in the bathroom.
The fact that gender-neutral bathrooms would better serve the safety interests of
all genders is, once again, "highly probative of the validiy"-or rather, the
invalidity--of sex-segregated bathrooms.2 73
The substantial-relation prong of the heightened scrutiny test also undercuts
the suggestion that sex-segregated bathrooms serve an interest in preventing
liability or in creating perceived safe spaces for women and men. As with the
privacy interest, the reliance on stereotypes about where women and men feel
safe obscures possible solutions to liability or safety concerns that do not require
segregation. This is perhaps most obvious in the hospital context, where
providers have innovated solutions to liability and safety concerns without
turning to sex segregation. The American Medical Association, for example,
recommends that "chaperones" accompany physicians during sensitive
examinations. 2 74 Many hospitals have adopted such policies, obviating the need
for single-sex wards. 275 If institutions are worried about avoiding lawsuits or
making men and women feel more safe, similar solutions are available in the
270. As Mary Anne Case observes, "the potential expected presence of both sexes in an integrated
restroom could also on occasion act as a deterrent, by decreasing the likelihood a perpetrator will be
alone with his intended victim and increasing the chances a bystander able and willing to offer aid
will be present." Case, supra note 70, at 221.
271. Sanders & Stryker, supra note 247247, at 783.
272. See, e.g., Ashley Harding, Man Arrested in McDonald's Bathroom Assault, NEWS 4 JAX, Aug. 22,
2015, 8:26 AM, http://www.news4jax.com/news/man-arrested-in-mcdonalds-bathroom-assault
20151107012115973 [https://perma.cc/B76J-D5XH]; Tierra Sharae, Man Sexually Assaults 2 Boys
in Westroads Mall Bathroom, Police Say, FOX42, Mar. 8, 2017, http://fox42kptm.com/news/local
/police-2-boys-sexually-assaulted-by-man-in-westroads-mall-bathroom [https://perma.cc/GG85-
629H].
273. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 78 (2001).
274. AM. MED. Assoc., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS ¶ 1.2.4 (2016), available at https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/EA8M-AAM5].
275. Danielle Ofri, Do Patients Need a Chaperon?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,2010, https://well.blogs.nytimes
.com/2010/12/02/do-patients-need-a-chaperone/ [https://perma.cc/MF5Q-UNZ7] ("[M]ost
institutions mandate that chaperons be present for rectal, pelvic and breast exams.").
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bathroom context. Best practices might include measures such as more private
stalls, bathroom attendants, or diverse, gender-neutral facility options for people
with different privacy desires. 27 6
Ultimately, sex segregation is not substantially related to advancing either
men's or women's actual or perceived safety and thus cannot survive
intermediate scrutiny.
IV. THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST SEX-SEGREGATED BATHROOMS
The sex segregation of bathrooms-if premised on the needs of biology,
privacy, or safety-would likely fail intermediate scrutiny. But a straightforward
application of intermediate scrutiny to sex-segregated bathrooms fails to account
for some case law, including Justice Ginsburg's footnote in VMI, that suggests
sex-segregated bathrooms may not be subject to that standard. Evaluating sex-
segregated bathrooms under intermediate scrutiny also fails to grapple with the
normative question of whether we want to eliminate sex-segregated bathrooms:
if segregation provides significant enough benefits, perhaps it is not a problem-
normatively, at least-if it relies on some stereotypes about men and women.
This Part argues that because sex-segregated bathrooms are subordinating to
women, recognizing them as unconstitutional would be both doctrinally correct
and normatively good. This argument will turn on demonstrating that sex-
segregated bathrooms not only rely on stereotypes but also perpetuate them in a
way that harms women and facilitates inadequate fulfillment of women's
needs.27 7
A. When Separate May Be Equal: The Subordination Distinction
Although laws requiring sex-segregated bathrooms clearly discriminate on
the basis of sex and do little to support important interests, there is some language
from Supreme Court opinions that suggests they nonetheless survive
intermediate scrutiny. In City of Cleburne, for example, Justice Marshall seemed
to look favorably upon sex-segregated bathrooms when he urged that "[a] sign
that says 'men only' looks very different on a bathroom door than a courthouse
door." 27 8 More significantly, Justice Ginsburg's footnote in VMI suggests that
276. For a description of some unisex bathroom designs intended to make all people feel safer, see Lisa
S. Davis, The Simple Design Solutions That Can Make Bathrooms Better-forAll Genders, QUARTZ,
Mar. 16, 2017, https://qz.com/933704/how-to-design-transgender-friendly-bathrooms-that-make-
people-of-all-genders-feel-safe [https://perma.cc/VE23-FYCG].
277. As mentioned previously, sex-segregated restrooms also do manifest harm to transgender people
and to people who do not identify with either gender or sex.
278. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 468-69 (1985).
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sex-segregated facilities-arguably including bathrooms-are constitutionally
permissible.
The significance of these comments, however, should not be overblown.
They represent underdeveloped, and ultimately unpersuasive, dicta and cannot
be construed as thorough defenses of sex segregation under intermediate
scrutiny. This characterization is particularly appropriate given that sex-
segregated bathrooms have never been directly challenged in court. The Justices'
passing acceptance of sex-segregated bathrooms in fact follows a pattern similar
to feminists' superficial approval of sex-segregated bathrooms during the ERA
debates.
Like feminists during the ERA debates, the Justices' failure to scrutinize sex-
segregated restrooms seems to reflect an assumption that this kind of
discrimination is not problematic. Remember that as a litigator Justice Ginsburg
suggested that "separate toilet facilities in public buildings . . . carr[y] no
implication of inferiority for either sex."2 79 In the absence of a clear
subordinating effect--or at least a lawsuit demonstrating a subordinating
effect-judges such as Justice Ginsburg have not seen bathrooms as a proper
target for our sex-discrimination jurisprudence.
Contrasting judicial treatment of racially segregated bathrooms with judicial
treatment of sex-segregated bathrooms highlights the role of this perceived lack
of subordination in judicial tolerance of sex-segregated bathrooms. While
transgender litigants sometimes invoke society's intolerance of race-segregated
bathrooms as evidence that transgender exclusion from bathrooms should be
reviled,280 judges tend to see race segregation as different. Because "racial
classifications are 'obviously irrelevant and invidious,"' as one Maryland judge
put it, "separate restroom . .. facilities for blacks and whites cannot be tolerated,
but such separate facilities for men and women can be justified." 281 The clear
implication is.that sex-segregated bathrooms are tolerable in part because, unlike
racially segregated bathrooms, they are not invidious. 2 82 Louise Antony
279. Emerson et al., supra note 78, at 902.
280. See, e.g., Sheryl G. Stolberg et al., How the Push To Advance Bathroom Rights for Transgender
Americans Reached the White House, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016
/05/22/us/transgender-bathroom-obama-schools.html [https://perma.cc/DB7X-UD42] (quoting the
mother of a transgender soldier saying "[i]t's separate but equal, so they might as well put black and
white up on the bathrooms, too").
281. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 98 (1985) (quoting Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S.
683, 687 (1963)).
282. It should be noted that judges have only recently begun to view race-based distinctions as invidious.
Indeed, widely accepted theories about why race-based distinctions are not invidious long justified
practices of racial subjugation and segregation in this country. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (holding that race-based classifications were permissible as long as they were
"reasonable," authorizing a judicial regime of "separate but equal" that persisted until Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). Without wading too deeply into the fraught legal and
social terrain of the race-sex analogy, widespread rejection of the once-popular, if vague, rationales
behind racial segregation might lead us to look with more suspicion upon the presently popular, if
vague, rationales behind sex-based segregation. For an overview of how scholars and activists have
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paraphrases scholar Richard Wassertrom as similarly urging that, while race-
segregated bathrooms are subordinating, "there seems to be nothing in the [sex]
segregation of bathrooms ... that evokes hierarchy, or that denigrates
women." 283
If judges have merely failed to recognize sex-segregated bathrooms as
subordinating, evidence that they are subordinating may push judges to apply
heightened scrutiny to them. Such evidence is particularly important in the face
of arguments that bathroom segregation benefits women. As the Court held in
Hogan, "[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one
sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that
is disproportionately burdened." 2 84 In VMI, Justice Ginsburg asserted that sex-
based distinctions in law might be used as a kind of affirmative action to
"compensate" women for past inequality or lack of opportunity.285 Many women
do seem to believe that bathrooms serve this compensatory purpose, without
subordinating effect. Those who oppose transgender access to bathrooms usually
frame their opposition in this manner. The "radical feminists" who filed a lawsuit
opposing President Obama's trans-inclusive Title IX guidance, for example,
urged that the guidance ignores the social reality that women need sex-segregated
spaces because they are weaker and more vulnerable to assault.286
Beyond the judicial sphere, demonstrating a subordinating effect may be
essential for establishing the normative case against sex-segregated bathrooms.
Women who defend sex-segregated bathrooms generally do so not in terms of
their substantial relation to an important government purpose but instead in a
subtler register. They defend sex-segregated bathrooms as protecting a
combination of privacy, safety, biology, cultural preference, and comfort. While
culture may be unimportant for purposes of heightened scrutiny, it is important
to many individuals. Bathrooms are "a place to escape from a browbeating boss
or importunate suitor, a place where they can cry without being seen and gossip
with one another without being overheard by any man, a place where they can
literally and figuratively let their hair down." 287 If bathrooms are what women
want, and they do not subordinate them, the argument might go, perhaps our sex
discrimination jurisprudence should not invalidate them.
I will dedicate the rest of this Part to demonstrating that sex-segregated
restrooms are, in fact, subordinating to all women. If segregated bathrooms
used, misused, and vigorously objected to analogies between race and sex discrimination as a means
of advancing feminist legal causes, see Serena Mayeri, "A Common Fate ofDiscrimination ": Race-
Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045 (2001).
283. Antony, supra note 92, at 4 (describing Richard Wassertrom's argument).
284. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (citation omitted).
285. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
286. Complaint, Women's Liberation Front v. U.S. Department of Justice et al., No. 1:16-cv-
00915 (D.N.M. Aug. 11, 2016).
287. Case, supra note 70, at 221.
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confer any benefits, they confer them in a manner that perpetuates the very
problems they seek to solve. While many women may support sex-segregated
bathrooms, or be simply indifferent towards them, sex segregation merits
opposition not just for the sake of transgender and queer communities but for the
sake of all women. Sex-segregated bathrooms do not merely fail to advance an
important government purpose. They perpetuate invidious stereotypes-some of
which hearken back to the nineteenth century-that harm women. Ultimately,
this Note aims to demonstrate that all women are harmed by bathrooms'
continued sex-based segregation.
B. Overcoming the Privacy Objection: Sex-Segregated Bathrooms Perpetuate
Harmful Stereotypes
One need only consult differences in bathroom design between men's and
women's rooms to understand how sex-segregated bathrooms both rely on and
perpetuate harmful sex-based stereotypes. As we have seen, there are no "real"
biological differences that justify sex-segregated bathrooms. Yet, men's and
women's rooms have drastically different designs. Men's restrooms typically
have a line of exposed urinals, with one or two stalls, while women's rooms
comprise only enclosed stalls. Such design differences are neither natural or
necessary, as countless gender-neutral bathrooms-which provide the same
setup for all genders-should demonstrate. Rather, such differences both assume
and perpetuate different levels of modesty for men and women.
While some might argue that different bathroom designs stem from
differences in men and women's notions of privacy, it is more likely that
different bathroom designs help produce the very differences in privacy
tolerances they supposedly accommodate. As Ruth Barcan has suggested,
"cubicles both assume and promote female modesty; they protect women from
experiencing shame while also potentially contributing to the source of that
shame, by enforcing women's bodily separateness from each other." 288 As
women's bathroom design promotes modesty, however, men's restroom design
enforces a much lower level of modesty. Men and boys who wish to avoid being
ostracized by peers must expect to expose their genitals-and be exposed to the
genitals of other men-each time they urinate in public. 289 Such differential
designs teach young women that bodily exposure in the restroom is
unacceptable 290 but teach young men that it is expected, generating the very
288. See Barcan, supra note 116, at 32.
289. "Some boys become targets for bullying-not perceived as being 'manly' enough to stand up, show
their equipment, and use a urinal-merely by entering a toilet cubicle." Anthony & Dufresne, supra
note 88, at 55.
290. See, e.g., ROSALIND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF MODERN
FEMINISM 140 (1982) ("[T]he little girl quickly learns that modesty is approved in her so she strives
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differences in privacy expectations that sex-segregated bathrooms purport to
accommodate.
Such differences in privacy expectations-produced in part by the state's
provision of sex-segregated bathrooms-are not innocuous. Notions that women
are more modest can be traced back to the separate-spheres ideology, which
sought to limit women's role in the public sphere. Women's "modesty,
meekness, and patience" have long been contrasted with men's "ambition and
determination" in assertions that women belong in the private sphere while men
belong in the public sphere.2 91 An expectation that women are more modest not
only limits women's sexual expression 29 2 but also places disproportionate
burdens on women to prevent harm-"distress in the form of prim outrage or
unwelcome sexual temptation for others"-by hiding and deemphasizing their
own bodies. 293 Such modesty carries over into other areas of life, leading women
to "de-emphasize their accomplishments to a greater extent than men. "294
Feminist theorists have long critiqued the privacy interest more generally, in
part because they have recognized that privacy-and particularly its heightened
association with women-has long been a means of perpetuating inequality. 2 95
The very notion of privacy itself is essential to the construction of the separate-
spheres ideology, which relegates women to prescribed roles in the private
sphere.296 Some feminist scholars have seen privacy as a means of perpetuating
male dominance by implying that something about women in particular needs to
be kept secret and by insulating the private abuse of women from public legal
intervention.297
Nonetheless, privacy can certainly play a positive role in women's and
others' lives, by promoting autonomy, liberty, and bodily integrity, both socially
and legally.298 Given privacy's positive dimensions, we might be tempted to
suggest that the subordinating effect of sex-segregated bathrooms could be
resolved by standardizing bathroom designs and making all bathrooms more
to be modest. Unfortunately, her modesty sets her apart from men, and it prevents her from becoming
inquisitive enough to consider changing herself.").
291. ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, GENDER IN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1650-1850: THE EMERGENCE OF SEPARATE
SPHERES?, 23-25 (1998).
292. Amy Kapczynski, supra note 242, at 1284-85 (describing courts' reliance on "notions of bodily
modesty and chastity that have long operated to deny women sexual autonomy").
293. Scott Woodcock, The Social Dimensions ofModesty, 38 CAN. J. PHIL. 1, 24 (2008).
294. Id. at 25.
295. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence ofPrivacy, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO
wOMEN'S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION 388, 389 (D. Kelly Weisberg et al.,
eds., 1996).
296. Id. at 388 ("The traditional notion of 'separate spheres' is premised on a dichotomy between the
'private' world of family and domestic life (the 'women's' sphere), and the 'public' world of
marketplace (the 'men's' sphere).").
297. MACKINNON, supra note 189, at 189-94.
298. Schneider, supra note 295, at 390.
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private. This may seem a healthy compromise, a way of ending the disparity of
modesty norms without actually integrating bathrooms. This would certainly be
welcome to many men for whom a lack of bathroom privacy-based on the sex-
based stereotype that men need less privacy-presents a substantial obstacle to
public restroom use.2 99 But it would definitively fail to resolve bathrooms'
subordinating effect on women.
An examination of the subordinating nature of the privacy interests
supposedly threatened by more private unisex bathroom designs-but not by
more private sex-segregated bathroom designs-reveals the inadequacy of the
latter solution. Carefully planned and partitioned unisex bathroom designs could
minimize privacy concerns related to genital exposure as effectively as sex-
segregated bathrooms. They could not, however, as successfully protect the
second privacy interest judges describe: preventing "injured self-esteem,
humiliation and embarrassment arising out of . .. conduct of bodily functions
within the perceptive range of members of the opposite sex." 300 And this seems
to be the privacy interest that proponents of sex segregation care about most.
Some women fear unisex bathrooms would mean a loss of a safe space where
they can conduct their "bodily functions"-do their hair, apply makeup, cry,
have conversations, adjust their clothing, and use the toilet-free from the male
gaze.301 While this concern is not enough to overcome heightened scrutiny, it
nonetheless presents a serious critique of bathroom integration.
This well-intentioned argument, however, merely perpetuates the very
harmful social stigma around women's bodies that often drives women to hide
their bodily functions from men in the first place. The point is perhaps best
illustrated by a number of Title VII cases in which judges have urged the
necessity of excluding male employees from observing women partially because
of the risk that these male employees might see their menstrual blood.302 Even
the risk that a man might become aware that a woman is menstruating is
unacceptable for some judges. 3 While judges frame these concerns in terms of
299. Anthony & Dufresne, supra note 88, at 54-55 (describing the benefits of increased privacy to men
with shy-bladder syndrome).
300. In re Long, 55 Cal. App. 3d 788, 127 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735 (Ct. App. 1976).
301. See, e.g., CLARA GREED, INCLUSIVE URBAN DESIGN: PUBLIC TOILETS 97 (2003).
302. Onejudge, for example, held that female sex is a BFOQ for a women's prison guard because "[s]ome
inmates may wish to use the toilet upon arising . .. one may find her night clothes and bedding
visibly soiled from an unexpected menstrual flow and wish to clean up." Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp.
1095, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980). The judge continued
that, "[u]nder these circumstances, I deem it inappropriate for a male guard to be making the first
count of the morning-with the inmates just awakened and their doors locked open." Id.
303. In one case, a judge suggested that a female prisoner's privacy would be violated if she needed to
"request sanitary napkins" from a male guard. Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corr., 391 F.3d 737,
758 (6th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of this case and its discriminatory implications, see Jami
Anderson, Bodily Privacy, Toilets, and Sex Discrimination: The Problem of "Manhood" in a
Women's Prison, in LADIES AND GENTS: PUBLIC TOILETS AND GENDER 90 (Olga Gershenson &
Barbara Penner eds., 2009).
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protecting women's privacy, they are clearly rooted in social taboos about
menstruation. Such language reflects beliefs that "menstrual blood is . . .
potentially contaminating of men" and that men "must be protected even from
knowing that a woman is menstruating." 304 In this case, sex segregation does not
merely protect women from the "embarrassment" of being "found out" while
menstruating. It also reproduces the harmful taboo it seeks to accommodate by
insulating men from menstruation altogether and judicially validating men's
anxiety about women's bodies. 305
Taboos around menstruation are only one example of how plausibly feminist
"safe space" privacy concerns help to perpetuate subordinating stereotypes about
women. Ultimately, the vague "privacy" some women seek in bathrooms-
whether it serves them while they do their hair and makeup or engage in
"unladylike" bodily functions-seems to be mostly an interest in "maintain[ing]
that sense of mystery or forbiddenness about the other sex's sexuality. "306
Scholars have in fact linked sexual identity to greater shame around using the
bathroom3 07: in one study, heterosexual women were one of the groups most
likely to be anxious about using public restrooms, in part because they feared
that escaped sights or sounds were "deviation[s] from gender ideals" that would
make them "unappealing" or unattractive. 3 08 These stereotypes about what
makes a woman valuable-namely, "purity, restraint, and 'femininity '"30 9-can
be traced back to Victorian notions of proper femininity that historically
underpinned sex-segregated restrooms. 3 10 By ensuring that men cannot see or
304. Overall, supra note 16, at 77.
305. Further, integrated bathrooms probably would not put women at greater risk of being "found out"
than anywhere else men and women spend time together-where it is also likely that a tampon will
fall out of a bag or pocket, or a stain will show through clothes. Weakening the taboo around
menstruation through integrated bathrooms might even relieve women of some of the significant
effort involved in hiding their periods in all aspects of life, whether they no longer felt the need to
hide tampons in their shirt sleeves, sneak around pharmacies with boxes of pads, or run home midday
to change stained pants.
306. Richard Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24
UCLA L. REV. 581, 594 (1976).
307. At least one empirical study found that members of both sexes, regardless of gender or sexuality,
are more anxious when using the bathroom in the presence of those that they are sexually attracted
to but had not yet dated. Martin S. Weinberg & Colin J. Williams, Fecal Matters: Habitus,
Embodiments, and Deviance, 52 SOC. PROBS. 315, 326 (2005).
308. See id. at 327-28 (describing how heterosexual men showed the "least concern about having a bowel
movement in a public restroom" while heterosexual women and non-heterosexual men demonstrated
the most concern).
309. Id. at 327 (linking heterosexual women's increased anxiety over defecation to "the particular image
that heterosexual women have been measured against, one that emphasizes purity, restraint, and
'femininity').
310. See Case, supra note 70, at 221 ("The notion of women's restrooms as a haven may carry over from
attitudes toward the far greater number of separate public spaces reserved in earlier centuries for
women only."); Clara Greed, Taking Women's Bodily Functions into Account in Urban Planning
and Policy. Public Toilets and Menstruation, 87 TOwN PLAN. REV. 505, 516 (2016). One can see a
more contemporary iteration of this longstanding shame around women's bodily functions in the
trope, "Everyone knows that women don't poop." Michael J. Mooney, The Queen of the Can, D
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hear when women defecate, or witness the rituals that women partake in in the
restroom for "restoring one's social face,"311 sex-segregated bathrooms help
perpetuate stereotypes about women's purity,312 heterosexuality,313 and
difference. 314
C. Overcoming the Safety Objection: Sex-Segregated Bathrooms Perpetuate
Dangers for Women
As discussed in Part III, sex-segregated bathrooms are not substantially
related to the interest of safety and may actually increase the danger of sexual
assault for all genders. The persistence of sex-segregated bathrooms, however,
does more damage beyond failing to serve women's safety needs. Common
arguments that sex-segregated bathrooms protect women's safety both rely on
and perpetuate sex-based stereotypes about women's vulnerability and men's
aggression, as well as frame transgender women as potential predators rather
than potential victims. These stereotypes make not only bathrooms, but also the
world at large more dangerous for women, both transgender and cisgender.
Remember that when justifying sex segregation, judges assert not a
generalized safety interest but instead an interest in protecting women from
becoming victims of, and men from perpetrating, sexual assault. This interest
aligns closely with common conservative objections to providing transgender
people access to the restroom that conforms with their identity. The exclusion of
transgender individuals from bathrooms stems not from a desire to discriminate,
the argument goes, but from a desire to ensure women's safety.315 Along with
the premise that "male" anatomy signals predation, safety-based justifications
have been put forward as a plausible "feminist" objection to the integration of
MAGAZINE, Mar. 2014, https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2014/march/the-
queen-of-the-can/2/ [https://perma.cc/4FSC-CV26]; see also Weinberg & Williams, supra note 307,
at 327 (quoting a study of participants reporting views that "girls don't poop" and describing
bathroom use as "not ladylike").
311. Barcan, supra note 116, at 26.
312. Cooper & Oldenziel, supra note 212, at 28-29 (describing how "[c]leanliness has long been
considered an area of female expertise and has been associated with sexual purity and virginity" and
arguing that this stereotype has historically been an important basis for both racial and sex-based
toilet segregation).
313. Overall, supra note 16, at 80 (arguing that "[t]he sex segregation of toilets arguably rests upon a
concept of privacy that assumes, falsely, both that heterosexuality is universal and that one needs to
be private from members of the other sex but not those of one's own sex").
314. Id. at 75 ("The practice of segregating public toilets on the basis of sex is a microcosm of the
operation of sex and gender norms. This practice instantiates beliefs about danger, purity, privacy,
heterosexism, and the significance of biological sex differences.").
315. See, e.g., Steve Harrison, HB2, Bathroom Safety Emerges as NC Campaign Issue. What Are the
Facts?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 28, 2016, 5:25 PM, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news
/politics-govemment/articlel lI 146872.html [https://perma.cc/9GUP-V7QF] (describing supporters
of a bathroom exclusion bill as primarily concerned about women and children's safety in
bathrooms).
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bathrooms.316 Strict sex segregation, however, may not stop "predators intent on
doing harm," and also leads to the harmful perception that a transgender woman
is a "red flag[]" or potential predator. 17 Safety-based objections to liberalized
bathroom access thus frame transgender women (who would otherwise be put at
risk in men's bathrooms) as undeserving of protection. Attempts to use such
women-protective arguments to oppose transgender access to restrooms, sincere
as they may be, should therefore not be entertained
In addition, a closer examination ofjudicial and popular reasoning about the
importance of sex-segregated spaces to women's safety reveals how harmful this
justification is to all women. When courts and others urge that only women are
victims of and only men are perpetrators of sexual assault, they rely on
assumptions that "women are by nature sexually seductive victims and that men
are by nature sexual predators." 1 ' While it may be true that women generally
are more likely to be sexually assaulted than men,3 19 sex segregation premised
on these generalizations "foster[s] subtle social understandings that women are
inherently vulnerable and in need of protection when in public."3 20 Further,
focusing on women's victimization as "exceedingly more common and more
worrisome" tends to cast women as passive and disempowered victims whose
sexual virtue is essential to their worth.3 21 Such stereotypes about women's
vulnerability and passivity should be familiar-they are the basis of a broader
separate-spheres ideology that limits women's capacity to fully participate in
public life.3 2 2
Further, by perpetuating social understandings about women's vulnerability
and men's aggression, sex-segregated bathrooms premised on safety may
actually make women more likely to experience sexual violence. Scholars have
316. See Complaint, Women's Liberation Front v. U.S. Department of Justice, No. 1:16-cv-00915 at
9 (D.N.M. August 11, 2016) (describing women's "different requirements for, and expectations of
... safety in restrooms" as a justification for keeping "men" out of women's rooms); Jeannie S.
Gersen, The Transgender Bathroom Debate and the Looming Title IX Crisis, NEW YORKER, May
24, 2016, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/public-bathroom-regulations-could-create-
a-title-ix-crisis [https://perma.cc/4APS-QXSF] ("[T]here is also a growing sense that some females
will not feel safe sharing bathrooms, shower rooms, or locker rooms with males.").
317. Kaeley Triller, A Conservative Defense of Women's Rights, NAT. REV., Jan. 5, 2017, 4:00 AM,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443534/conservatives-defend-women-oppose-transgender-
bathrooms-showers [https://perma.cc/K5DY-N4SW].
318. Anderson, supra note 303, at 101.
319. Statistics About Sexual Violence, NAT. SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR. 1 (2015),
https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications nsvrcfactsheetmedia-packet statistics-
about-sexual-violence 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RPD-34NP] (describing higher incidences of sexual
assault for women as compared to men).
320. Kogan, supra note 16, at 56; see also Lara Stemple & Ilan H. Meyer, The Sexual Victimization of
Men in America: New Data Challenge Old Assumptions, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e19, e19 (2014)
("[C]ontemporary depictions of sexual victimization reinforce the stereotypical sexual victimization
paradigm, comprising male perpetrators and female victims.").
321. Stemple & Meyer, supra note 320, at e20.
322. See supra Part I.A.
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long postulated that "[e]xplanations of violence against women should center on
gendered social arrangements and power," including social arrangements
reinforced by the state.323 More specifically, a number of researchers and social
theorists have suggested that stereotypes about women's vulnerability and men's
aggression may contribute to the prevalence of man-on-woman sexual assault.32 4
While the link between culture and gendered violence is contested, prevalent
stereotypes about male aggression likely work in combination with stereotypes
about women's vulnerability and need for protection to produce gendered
violence.325 Sex-segregated bathrooms, by perpetuating these very stereotypes,
may thus facilitate the very violence they seek to prevent.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, stereotype-driven beliefs that sex
segregation advances safety prevent lawmakers from actually addressing sexual
assault in bathrooms through more effective means than a "ladies only" sign.
Indeed, it is only lawmakers' reliance on stereotypes about women's inherent
vulnerability and men's inherent aggression that makes sex-segregated
bathrooms, which have proven to be an ineffective safeguard for anyone's safety,
appear to be a plausible solution to sexual violence. When lawmakers cast
women's sexual vulnerability as a real difference, rather than a stereotype, in
other words, "[t]he conditions that create women's rapability are not seen as
susceptible to legal change." 326 Sex segregation becomes the legal "solution" to
sexual violence, and a holistic approach to addressing gender violence appears
less pressing. At the very least, states' misguided reliance on sex-based
stereotypes prevents them from moving away from sex segregation and toward
gender-neutral bathroom options that would better advance everyone's safety.3 27
D. Separate and Unequal: Sex-Segregated Bathrooms Subordinate Women's
Needs
Beyond perpetuating stereotypes that harm women, sex-segregated
bathrooms harm women by inadequately providing for their needs. Far from
323. Gwen Hunnicutt, Varieties ofPatriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting "Patriarchy"
as a Theoretical Tool, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 553, 554 (2009).
324. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 343-58 (1975)
(discussing how the socialization of girls as victims and boys as perpetrators of rape contributes to
the occurrence of rape); NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN SHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING
RAPE IN AMERICA 255 (1976) ("Men are conditioned to be rapists; women are conditioned to be
victims."); Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 217, 229 (1980) ("Rape is the logical and psychological extension of a dominant-
submissive, competitive, sex role stereotyped culture.").
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"intentionally and directly assist[ing]" 328 women or "compensate[ing]" them for
past inequality,3 2 9 separate bathrooms perpetuate women's inequality by
disproportionately underserving them. Although public restrooms may leave
much to be desired as a general matter, "public restrooms have long
discriminated against certain segments of our society, especially women."330
While men and even women tend to dismiss unequal bathroom provision as the
natural result of biological or other differences-e.g., women are simply slower
or more fussy in the bathroom-such reasoning from "real" difference should
appear suspect at this point.
One need only observe the disproportionate lines and wait times for
bathrooms at museums, parks, sporting arenas, or bars to understand the degree
to which women's needs are underserved by current sex-segregated bathroom
designs.331 While women may take longer to go to the bathroom, as described in
Part III, this is largely due to other, social factors such as women's clothing and
expectations that women should assist children or older relatives in the
restroom.33 2 Even if women are slower "by nature," current bathroom designs
exacerbate rather than accommodate this problem. Men's rooms tend to have
twice the number of places to urinate as women's rooms because they contain
urinals in addition to stalls. 333 Further, despite the smaller volume of people that
women's restrooms can serve, in many places there are still fewer or smaller
women's restrooms than men's restrooms. 3 34
A "potty parity" movement has attempted to remedy such inadequate
bathroom provision for women. Some proposals include reforming building
codes to require more bathroom space for women and shifting the "equality"
metric from equal square footage to equal wait time for men and women. 335 Yet
this movement has had limited impact, and where it has been successful it has
experienced backlash-largely from men.33 6 This is particularly ironic given that
bathrooms are supposedly premised on societal concern for men and women's
differing needs. Concern about biological difference disappears, it seems, when
it is women who call for appropriate accommodation. This is especially true
328. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
329. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320
(1977) (per curiam).
330. Anthony & Dufresne, supra note 88, at 49.
331. Id. at 51-53.
332. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
333. Greed, supra note 205, at 118.
334. Anthony & Dufresne, supra note 88, at 51.
335. Id. at 56-57.
336. Id. at 58 ("Ironically, while women have waited in long ladies' room lines for years, the passage of




when more adequate provision for women might undermine unhindered access
by men.
It is clear that sex-segregated bathrooms-while purportedly benefiting
women through increased privacy and safety-place disproportionate burdens
on women's time, comfort, and energy. A supposedly "equal" system of sex
segregation that systematically underserves women is not only constitutionally
suspect but also normatively undesirable. Inadequate provision is not merely
inconvenient; it enacts both practical and dignitary harms. People using the
women's restroom must wait longer in line, suffer discomfort in the meantime,
and even adjust their schedules to account for scarce restrooms. The harms,
however, go deeper. Judith Plaskow perhaps puts it best:
Little girls crossing their legs and waiting with their mothers on endless
bathroom lines absorb important lessons about what it means to live in
a society in which the built environment consistently fails to reflect
women's experiences and needs. In addition, girls are being conditioned
to accept their peripheral status quietly and patiently. 33 7
Sex-segregated bathrooms, which systematically underserve women's needs,
instantiate and perpetuate harmful stereotypes that women's time and needs are
less important. By making women uncomfortable in public, inadequate modem
facilities reinforce the familiar stereotype that the public sphere is better suited
for men.
Ultimately, when it comes to sex-segregated bathrooms, it seems that
separate is inherently unequal. It is likely that as long as men use different
restrooms from women, bathrooms will continue to inefficiently utilize space in
a way that distinctly harms women. While comprehensive "potty parity" reform
might ultimately reduce inequalities in bathroom access, it would still fail to
eliminate the subtle messages about women's modesty, difference, and inherent
vulnerability that bathroom segregation necessarily conveys. Only integrated
restrooms could both resolve access inequalities and eliminate these harmful
stereotypes.
CONCLUSION
In 1975, attorney Ruther Bader Ginsburg wondered "[w]ho would bring the
testing lawsuit" to challenge sex-segregated bathrooms under the ERA. As the
suspect history, faulty legal reasoning, and normative undesirability behind
bathrooms should demonstrate, it may be time for more feminists to consider
taking Justice Ginsburg's question seriously. As a matter of law, sex-segregated
337. Plaskow, supra note 35, at viii.
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bathrooms fail to serve any important government interest. Moreover, they both
rely on and perpetuate harmful stereotypes about women in a manner that should
be disturbing to those interested in advancing gender equality.
Beyond the strength of the claim that sex-segregated bathrooms are
unconstitutional, feminists should note that a constitutional challenge to
segregation becomes less radical every day. Increasing numbers of restaurants,
clubs, and art galleries now boast multi-user gender-neutral facilities."' Gender-
neutral restrooms are becoming the norm on college campuses.339 Cities
throughout the country have already begun to mandate the conversion of sex-
designated single-user facilities into gender-neutral ones. 34 0 Litigants might use
such local ordinances as a guide to incrementalism-even if judges might cling
to the privacy and safety arguments justifying sex segregation, such arguments
are at their very weakest in the context of single-user facilities.
While a legal and activist strategy for integrating restrooms is beyond the
scope of this Note, one thing should be clear. Attempts to use women-protective
arguments to oppose transgender individuals' access to restrooms should not be
entertained. All women's activists, rather than frustrating the progress of
transgender litigants with ultimately hollow concerns about safety, privacy, or
biological difference, should join them in contributing to their important pursuit
of gender-based equality. By bringing to the fore questions about who may
access sex-segregated bathrooms, transgender and other gender-nonconforming
activists have helped illuminate serious constitutional concerns about why these
spaces are segregated in the first place. More importantly, they have examined
the assumptions about women's difference, privacy, and safety that underlie
these institutions. Such an examination can only advance the feminist cause.
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